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NOTE

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2530th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 19 April 1984, at 6 p.m.

President: Mr. Vladimir A. KRAVETS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2530)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in the Middle East:
   Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/16472)

The meeting was called to order at 6.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/16472)

1. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Lebanon in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Fakhoury (Lebanon) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period 13 October 1983 to 9 April 1984 [*S/16472*]. Members of the Council also have before them the following other documents: S/16471, containing the text of a letter dated 9 April 1984 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General; and S/16491, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

3. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions [resolution 549 (1984)].

4. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the vote.

5. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [*interpretation from Russian*]: Time and again the Council has had to return to the question of the abnormal situation in Lebanon, a situation which has been caused by Israeli aggression. This matter has become a permanent feature of the activities of the Council for six years now. Indeed, the Council may have devoted more time and attention to Lebanon than to any other country. The already lengthy list of resolutions adopted on this item continues to grow. Eventually, the chronic failure to implement Council resolutions on Lebanon may come to be regarded as commonplace and normal.

6. Such a situation cannot but cause grave concern. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the time has now come for the Council to take another serious look at the root causes of the dangerous tension which has turned Lebanon into a constantly smouldering source of war. I am referring, of course, to the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and to Israel's continued illegal occupation of more than a third of Lebanese territory.

7. In its resolution 425 (1978), adopted almost six years ago after Israel's invasion of Lebanon in March 1978, the Council demanded that Israel cease its aggression and withdraw its troops behind the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon. As the Council is aware, that resolution has remained virtually unim-

plemented, and the United Nations Interim Force that was created on the basis of that resolution has, as it were, received a permanent mission in southern Lebanon.

8. In the light of the new, even larger-scale, bloody aggression in Lebanon that was unleashed by Israel in June 1982, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), in which it demanded the immediate cessation of all military actions in Lebanon and the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory. That demand was reconfirmed in subsequent resolutions of the Council.

9. However, to date all those resolutions continue to be blatantly ignored by Tel Aviv, and the Zionist occupiers continue to lord it over Lebanese soil. The hundreds of thousands that have been killed and injured, the towns and villages that have been destroyed and the misdeeds in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila are by no means a complete list of the crimes committed by the Israeli military machine.

10. We can only regard this as a continuation of the expansionist policy pursued by Israeli ruling circles, which are hatching plans to divide up Lebanon and making use of the experience as occupiers they have acquired on the West Bank of the River Jordan, in the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. The blood and suffering of the Lebanese and other Arab peoples have fed the ill-fated strategic alliance between Tel Aviv and Washington: no longer a mere conniver, Washington has become a direct accomplice in Israeli aggression. As is perfectly obvious, Israel's aggression against Lebanon in June 1982 was from the very outset prepared with the knowledge of the United States.

11. In his memoirs, which have just been published, the former Secretary of State of the United States, Alexander Haig, gives the following very telling account of events. As far back as October 1981 the then Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Begin, informed Haig that Israel had started to plan its invasion of Lebanon. Nevertheless, a month later, in November, the United States signed a memorandum on strategic co-operation with Israel. In mid-January 1982, Mr. Begin once again reminded Haig that Israel was preparing to attack southern Lebanon. In February 1982, at a meeting with Haig in Washington, the Commander of Israeli military intelligence made it clear that Israeli troops that had invaded Lebanon intended to advance right up to the southern suburbs of Beirut. In other words, the United States already had a clear idea of the scope of the new act of aggression being prepared by Israel. In the beginning of May 1982, Begin warned the United States that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was becoming, as he expressed it, imperative and inevitable. Finally, at the end of May, both Begin and Sharon told their American allies that Israel's decision to invade Lebanon was final and irreversible. That is the history of how Israel's aggression was prepared.

12. How did the United States conduct itself in these circumstances? As can be seen from the same memoirs, it simply advised Israel to find some sort of excuse for the invasion, for otherwise, as the Israelis were told by Haig, American public opinion might not tolerate such an operation. The conclusion is that the United States was aware of Israel's planned aggression against Lebanon eight months before it actually began. It was regularly in consultation with Israel at all stages of preparation. But the United States not only did nothing to stop the invasion; it continued to supply Israel with weapons and military *matériel*, making it possible for the invasion to take place through its material support. That is why—and this is now quite irrefutable—Israel's aggression against Lebanon was virtually a joint American-Israeli aggression.

13. The following stage of the United States involvement in the war against the Arabs was the introduction of American fighting troops in Lebanese territory under the banner of so-called multinational forces and their ensuing land, sea and air bombardment of the Arab population. So here we have it: two sides of the same coin, the aggression of Israel and the aggression of the United States against the Arabs. That, then, is American-Israeli strategic co-operation in action.

14. In connection with the situation that now obtains in southern Lebanon, it is the profound conviction of the Soviet delegation that the Security Council faces an extremely important problem. One may legitimately ask how long the principal organ of the United Nations, the Security Council, can acquiesce in Israel's continuing occupation of the territory of a neighbouring Member State. How long will it continue to allow the aggressor and its protectors to ignore with impunity its numerous resolutions when their strict implementation is an obligation incumbent upon all States Members of the Organization? There can be no doubt as to the answer to that question: the Council cannot, nor should it, acquiesce in such a situation, when, as a result of Israel's stubborn refusal to put an end to its occupation of Lebanese territory, the aggressor, in defiance of the entire world, continues to grow in strength on the lands it has seized and United Nations forces are unable to perform the main task they have been given by the Council—that is, to ensure supervision of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon.

15. It is the bounden duty of the Security Council to insist that Israel unconditionally fulfil the previously adopted decisions demanding that an end be put to the Israeli aggression in Lebanon.

16. In the light of the request by the Lebanese Government and the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the Soviet delegation feels that there is no particular objection at the present stage to extending the mandate of UNIFIL for the next regular period. At the same time, however, it is our assumption that during that period the Council will take every step necessary to put an end to the Israeli occupation. If

Israel nevertheless fails to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, the Council will have to—we stress: will have to—carry out the task entrusted to it by the Charter and consider the adoption of effective practical steps in response to those circumstances. We can no longer continue to acquiesce in Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory and its concomitant disregard of Council decisions.

17. The Soviet delegation takes this opportunity to confirm once again the Soviet Union's fundamental position of principle with regard to UNIFIL. First, the maintaining of the Force on Lebanese territory should in no wise impinge upon Lebanon's sovereign rights. Secondly, UNIFIL should not be entrusted with functions not in accordance with its duties as defined by the Charter; nor should it intervene in Lebanon's affairs. Thirdly, full account should be taken of Israel's responsibility, as the aggressor, for the deeds it has perpetrated.

18. In this connection, we confirm that all the expenses related to dealing with the consequences of Israel's armed aggression against Lebanon should be borne by the aggressor itself. For that reason, the Soviet Union, as in the past, will not participate in defraying expenses connected with the establishment and functioning of UNIFIL.

19. Mr. CLARK (United States of America): Members of the Council have unanimously agreed that the resolution just adopted does not in any way go beyond resolution 538 (1983), but simply extends it. It was with this understanding that the United States voted in favour of the resolution.

20. Mr. LOUET (France) [*interpretation from French*]: The Security Council has just once again renewed the mandate of UNIFIL. By according its support to the Council's decision, the French delegation has demonstrated France's support for the United Nations role in Lebanon and the importance it attaches to UNIFIL's complete fulfilment of the task assigned to it by resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

21. In this connection, my delegation cannot but share the concerns expressed by the Secretary-General in his report issued in connection with the renewal of the Force's mandate. UNIFIL has not been able to live up completely to the hopes that the international community, represented by the Council, and the Lebanese people, victim of an interminable conflict, had placed in it. The Israeli invasion of June 1982 in fact radically changed the conditions in which UNIFIL acts. The Israel Defence Forces continue to operate, in violation of Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), in the Force's deployment area. That is the main reason for the difficulties encountered by UNIFIL in fulfilling its tasks. It is to be hoped that this abnormal situation will soon come to an end, so that Lebanon's integrity and its Government's authority can be restored within its internationally recognized boundaries, pursuant to resolution 520 (1982).

22. All the inhabitants of southern Lebanon aspire to peace. UNIFIL should be in a position to ensure more effective protection and greater security for the civilian population of that region.

23. My delegation has noted with great interest the observations made by the Secretary-General in his report, and particularly the idea of having the Council consider at the appropriate time a future course of action that would make the Force's mandate more effective. France shares the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of peace and stability in southern Lebanon, under the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government, "represents, in the long run ... the best guarantee of security for all concerned" [*S/16472, para. 26*]. UNIFIL can make a useful contribution to that development. That is why France is prepared to consider the new tasks that the Council might in due course see fit to entrust to UNIFIL. We are prepared, especially if a request to this effect is made in due course by the Government of Lebanon, to consider the extension of UNIFIL's mandate and deployment area. It is in that spirit that France will co-operate with the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of the mandate just given him.

24. Before concluding, I would pay a tribute to the persevering work done by UNIFIL's officers and soldiers, who have constantly discharged their obligations with courage and dedication, in particularly delicate circumstances.

25. France, which contributes the largest number of troops to UNIFIL, is fully aware of the effort made by the countries contributing to the Force. We understand the concerns of some of our partners at the often-frustrating conditions in which their troops operate. We hope that a satisfactory solution may quickly be found to the financing problems emphasized by the Secretary-General in paragraph 27 of his report. None the less, France is convinced that it is important to maintain in southern Lebanon a United Nations presence that could, in what we hope will be the near future, prove to be a crucial factor in the re-establishment of peace and security in that region.

26. Mr. KHALIL (Egypt) [*interpretation from Arabic*]: The delegation of Egypt views the endorsement by the Council of the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL for another six months as further evidence of the international community's continued commitment to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, as expressed in numerous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

27. The delegation of Egypt supports the statement by the Secretary-General in his last report, which included a call for restoring the situation in southern Lebanon to normal. We agree in fact with the comments made by the Secretary-General at the end of the report, and we cannot fail to note the earlier references therein to the

marked increase in hostility on the part of the local population to the presence of the Israel Defence Forces. Such hostility is a natural result of any occupation.

28. The Lebanese Government considers UNIFIL's continued presence in Lebanon indispensable and imperative, as is reflected in the letter of its representative of 9 April, in which he requests the extension of UNIFIL's mandate for another six months, under the same terms of reference set forth in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), among other relevant Council resolutions.

29. We, too, feel that the UNIFIL presence in Lebanon is an important expression of the United Nations commitment to support the Lebanese Government in its efforts to regain complete control and authority over southern Lebanon. Hence, we supported the draft resolution which was put to the vote a few moments ago.

30. Egypt's position is well known: on previous occasions, both inside and outside the United Nations, we have consistently called for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces—in particular those of Israel—from Lebanese territory. We wish today to reiterate that position by quoting the official joint communiqué issued at Cairo on 11 April 1984 following the official visit to Egypt by President André-Dieudonné Kolingba of the Central African Republic. Presidents Mubarak and Kolingba called for the complete and immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanese territory in accordance with Security Council resolutions. The two Presidents expressed support for all efforts aimed at achieving conciliation in Lebanon and the preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

31. Mr. van der STOEL (Netherlands): When the Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL in October 1983, I informed the Council of my Government's decision to retain a limited contingent with the Force in southern Lebanon. In close co-operation with both the Secretary-General and UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura, the Netherlands battalion has since been repatriated and replaced by a reinforced infantry company of the strength of approximately 165 men. I may also recall that the main reason for our decision to maintain a presence in UNIFIL has been our conviction that UNIFIL still could and should play a more meaningful role than the Force is able to fulfil at present. I need not recall here that the tasks currently carried out by UNIFIL, in particular the humanitarian assistance rendered to the local population in its area of operation, together with its contribution to peace and stability in southern Lebanon, however beneficial these may be, do not conform to the original mandate as spelt out in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), nor to the intentions of later Council resolutions on the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in southern Lebanon.

32. We strongly concur with the observation of the Secretary-General in his latest report on UNIFIL that a return to genuine peace and normality in southern Lebanon would be in the interest of virtually all. We are pleased to note a more general recognition of UNIFIL's stabilizing role in southern Lebanon and of the important role the Force could play in changing for the better the situation in that region. The Secretary-General has suggested in his report that the Council

> "consider at the appropriate time, and without prejudice to arrangements elsewhere in Lebanon, a future course of action which would make more effective the mandate of UNIFIL specifically in southern Lebanon, in the context of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that area" [*ibid., para. 25*].

33. We commend the Secretary-General for the ideas he has put forward and for the consultations he has undertaken in recent weeks on further means to achieve the objectives of an Israeli withdrawal, the restoration of peace and normality and the re-establishment of the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government in southern Lebanon in conformity with resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and other relevant Council resolutions. For our part, we stand ready to vote for any Council resolution providing for a better framework for the attainment of these objectives, with which all parties would seem to concur. As one of the troop contributors, we feel that a Council decision that would reactivate the role of UNIFIL is already long overdue.

34. In his report, the Secretary-General has also cautioned that one should not underestimate the difficulties of working out a plan directed to the attainment of these overall objectives—a plan which would at the same time meet the rights and interests of the Government and people of Lebanon and the concerns of all those now involved in southern Lebanon. Notwithstanding these difficulties, we think the time has come for all parties involved to reconsider seriously the role UNIFIL could play in the re-establishment of peaceful, normal conditions in southern Lebanon, which, as the Secretary-General has pointed out, would represent in the long run the best hope for the future and the best guarantee of security for all.

35. We therefore urge all parties concerned to make appropriate use of the potential of United Nations peace-keeping operations to restore international peace and security in the region. Failure to grasp the opportunities which seem to present themselves now could have grave consequences later. Moreover, it is also evident that the international community—which at great costs, particularly for the troop-contributing countries, has maintained UNIFIL in the region for almost two years since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon—cannot be expected to support Lebanon indefinitely.

36. In this connection, I may be forgiven if I draw the Council's attention once more to the financial difficul-

ties faced by UNIFIL. We read in the report of the Secretary-General that, as of the beginning of April 1984, the accumulated shortfall in the UNIFIL Special Account has risen to some $186.4 million. We are all aware that some Member States consistently fail to honour their obligations, thereby creating major financial problems for the Organization and for the troop contributors, for that matter. The Secretary-General has shown himself extremely concerned about this state of affairs, which indeed could jeopardize the whole concept of peace-keeping operations.

37. Lastly, although UNIFIL has been set up by the Council for the purpose of facilitating the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, it would be unfair and unrealistic to ignore the other aspects of the crisis in Lebanon, which need to be addressed urgently as well. Let me therefore briefly restate the position of my Government: we continue to be deeply concerned about the situation in and around Beirut and we again call on all parties concerned to refrain forthwith from the use of force and to agree promptly to a cease-fire. We once more wish to stress the need for a resumption without further delay of the process of conciliation and negotiation aimed at the establishment of a government enjoying the widest possible national support and exercising authority throughout the territory of Lebanon. Such a government would be in a much stronger position to assert its authority and to accomplish the desired goal of a complete withdrawal of all non-authorized non-Lebanese forces from Lebanese territory. The position of my Government on this issue remains unchanged: we fully support the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, and it is clear that this requires the withdrawal of all unauthorized foreign forces from Lebanese territory.

38. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): The continuing plight of the Lebanese people touches most, if not all of us. The Council has a duty to do all it can to help restore the peace and stability which they seek and to uphold the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of their State.

39. In his letter of 9 April to the Secretary-General, the representative of Lebanon stated that his Government believed that the time might have come for the Security Council to reassess the mission of UNIFIL so that it could perform a more dynamic role. My Government agrees with this and has long advocated an expanded United Nations presence in Lebanon. We much regretted that the Council was prevented, two months ago, from taking action to strengthen the United States presence in Beirut. We are pleased, therefore, that the Secretary-General has proposed in his report to the Council that UNIFIL should be enabled in the near future to play an expanded role. This is both helpful and constructive. We welcome the soundings which he has already taken with the parties concerned. We believe that this is the right way to proceed and we support the objectives which he has set out in his report. As he rightly states, all concerned have common interests in changing the situation in southern Lebanon for the better.

40. For our part, the United Kingdom is ready at the appropriate time to consider with the rest of the Council the future course of action suggested by the Secretary-General. We hope that other Council members will join us in encouraging the Secretary-General to continue his exploration of the possibilities with the parties concerned. We interpret the resolution we have just adopted as endorsing further action by the Secretary-General on these lines. For this reason, and because we support in the meantime the further extension of UNIFIL's existing mandate, we were pleased to vote in favour of the resolution. My delegation regrets that two delegations have not felt able to support this otherwise universally praised peace-keeping action by the United Nations.

41. I am obliged once again to draw attention to the grave financial difficulties confronting UNIFIL. My delegation echoes the Secretary-General's extreme concern at this unacceptable state of affairs. We join with him in calling on the States concerned to pay their assessments without delay.

42. Finally, I should like to take this opportunity once more to pay tribute to General Callaghan, his staff, the officers and men of UNIFIL and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization military observers, for their continued dedication to their task.

43. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I call upon the representative of Lebanon.

44. Mr. FAKHOURY (Lebanon) [*interpretation from Arabic*]: Mr. President, allow me at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of April and to thank you for your efforts to promote the success of the consultations on renewal of UNIFIL's mandate. Those efforts reflect your statesmanship and experience.

45. Allow me also to extend thanks to your predecessor, Mr. Arias Stella, the representative of Peru, President of the Council during the month of March, for his excellent and tactful conduct of the Council's work.

46. Once more Lebanon requests a six-month renewal of the UNIFIL mandate, on the basis of the terms defined in resolution 426 (1978).

47. UNIFIL, about whose situation the Secretary-General spoke in detail in his report of 9 April 1984, has been unable, for reasons well known to everyone here which I see no need to repeat now, to discharge in full the mandate assigned it by the Council.

48. UNIFIL still has a long way to go to discharge and complete its mission in the best possible manner. In this connection, the report of the Secretary-General recommended an extension of UNIFIL's mandate and a fu-

ture course of action to make it more effective. I requested a reassessment of the Force in my letter dated 9 April addressed to the Secretary-General. My Government believes that time may have come for the Council to reassess the mission of UNIFIL in the light of the dangers looming over occupied southern Lebanon and their effects on that population. Hence, we strongly support the contents of the report of the Secretary-General, his comments on the future of UNIFIL, and the initiative he called for, in consultation with the Lebanese Government and the parties concerned, to enable UNIFIL to achieve the objectives of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and other relevant resolutions.

49. In addition, we strongly support the Secretary-General's proposal for the temporary deployment of UNIFIL, with elements of the Lebanese army and internal security forces, in areas vacated by Israeli forces. Similarly, we strongly support UNIFIL's expanded deployment to assist in the restoration of Lebanese authority and sovereignty up to the internationally recognized boundary, as well as the working out of the necessary arrangements to ensure the speedy transformation of southern Lebanon into a zone of peace under the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government.

50. My Government also hopes that the main arterial roads in the south will soon be brought under UNIFIL supervision. My Government calls for an opening of all crossing points and roads leading to the south. We call for an end to all activities being carried out against the civilian Lebanese population and officials.

51. The conditions prevailing in southern Lebanon are extremely grave, and the measures taken by the Israeli authorities, including blocking the main highway to the south, lead to the dismemberment of southern Lebanon and its partitioning from Lebanon and subject it to economic and security regulations that have adverse effects on the status of the population there. Southern Lebanon is part and parcel of the Lebanese homeland. Peace throughout Lebanon is closely bound to the question of southern Lebanon and its fate.

52. In this connection, it is imperative to affirm categorically that the Lebanese Government does not recognize any military formations or commands that have not been officially and legitimately established or appointed. Hence it does not recognize or deal on any level or in any context with any such artificial military formations and commands, including the so-called Army of South Lebanon, or Lahad's army.

53. The Council's responsibility in this question is both direct and of great importance because it is charged with the preservation of international peace and security and, hence, with responsibility for the peace and security of any Member State in the world whose citizens are beset by the same suffering being inflicted on the population of southern Lebanon. The peoples of the world look to the Council as virtually their last chance to put an end to their sufferings and their tragic situation. The Council's positive response to any rightful demand enhances the confidence of the peoples of the world that, in the end, there is an authority to which they can have recourse, one that will assist them in achieving their hopes and aspirations to live in peace and security.

54. In view of the critical conditions that exist at present in southern Lebanon, we regard the resolution adopted by the Council today as a further step forward in the discharge of UNIFIL's basic mission. We also regard it as a point of departure for serious initiatives, under the Council's supervision, to be undertaken personally by the Secretary-General.

55. In conclusion, I must, on behalf of the Government and people of Lebanon, express great thanks to the Secretary-General for his report, which is characteristically clear and candid and which includes practical and realistic elements and a comprehensive outlook inspired by his sincere desire to contribute effectively to the restoration of peace and security in southern Lebanon. I should also like to extend thanks to the States participating in UNIFIL and to their troops in southern Lebanon under the command of Lieutenant-General Callaghan, as well as to all his staff, civilian and military, for their praiseworthy work under conditions that are, to put it mildly, extremely difficult, in view of the fact that circumstances do not yet allow UNIFIL to discharge its mission as expected.

56. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of Israel in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Blum (Israel) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

57. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*] The representative of Israel has asked to speak. I therefore invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

58. Mr. BLUM (Israel): At the outset, permit me to express to you, Sir, my respects on your assumption of the presidency for this month. May I also take this opportunity to express our warm appreciation to the representative of Peru for the very able and effective manner in which he carried out the functions of the presidency last month.

59. It had not been my intention to intervene in this debate. However, in view of the highly intemperate and

grossly inaccurate statements made by some of the speakers here today, I feel constrained to restate my Government's position on the matter before us —which, may I remind certain members of the Council, is the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL.

60. As I have repeatedly had occasion to state in the Council, it is my Government's view that, in the circumstances surrounding the situation in Lebanon since June 1982, UNIFIL has outlived its usefulness in southern Lebanon and its presence is no longer called for there. As was rightly stated by the Secretary-General in his report on UNIFIL dated 14 October 1982, the events of 1982 had "radically altered the circumstances in which UNIFIL was established and under which it had functioned since March 1978" [*S/15455, para. 17*]. Likewise, in his report on UNIFIL dated 12 October 1983 the Secretary-General again stated that those events "radically altered the conditions under which UNIFIL was created and is intended to function" [*S/16036, para. 21*]. The growing recognition to this effect is also evidenced by the position adopted in recent months by a number of contributing countries which, seeing no effective mission for UNIFIL in its present area of deployment, have accordingly reduced their troops in the field.

61. It is Israel's position that the security of southern Lebanon should eventually be guaranteed by Lebanese forces. At the same time, Israel believes that UNIFIL could perform a useful role by serving as a buffer separating the Israel Defence Forces and the Syrian forces currently in Lebanon. Likewise, in the view of the Government of Israel, UNIFIL could fulfil a useful function north of the area of deployment of the Israel Defence Forces, where it could serve as a genuine peace-keeping force. With regard to the possibility of UNIFIL's deployment there, including the Sidon area, the Government of Israel would be prepared to consider and discuss this matter in due course.

62. As for the Secretary-General's recent report on UNIFIL, in general my Government has reservations in regard to many of the remarks, statements and observations contained therein. Some of these reservations have already been communicated to the Secretary-General. I will therefore confine myself here today to the following remarks.

63. First, the resolutions of the Council referred to in paragraph 22 of the Secretary-General's report cannot be regarded by Israel as the basis for consideration by the Council of the issue before us, in view of the fact that the situation on the ground clearly demonstrates that it is not Israel's military presence in the southern part of Lebanon that lies at the root of Lebanon's instability. Regrettably, the report makes no mention of the presence of Syrian and terrorist forces in Lebanon, of their well-documented responsibility for destabilizing that country as a whole and of their role in depriving the Lebanese Government of its authority by arrogating that authority to themselves. Consequently, the Government of Israel cannot accept the overall approach reflected in paragraph 25 of the report.

64. Secondly, it is equally regrettable that the Secretary-General's report makes no mention of those resolutions of the Council which call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory, as for example resolution 520 (1982).

65. Thirdly, Israel likewise regards paragraph 16 of the report as incomplete in its treatment of the numerous terrorist incidents in the area. This is further compounded by the fact that the identity of the perpetrators of those terrorist acts is omitted.

66. I have deliberately refrained in my statement from responding to some provocative and inflammatory statements made earlier here containing the customary distortions regarding the situation in Lebanon as a whole. My Government's position on that question is well known and requires no repetition here. Since the matter on the agenda is the extension of UNIFIL's mandate, which apparently seems to have been forgotten by the representative of the Soviet Union, I have confined myself in my statement to the issues properly related to the item on the agenda. Any outburst such as the outburst of the representative of the Soviet Union which we have heard here earlier in this meeting is in our view hardly worthy of comment in a civilized debate.

67. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [*interpretation from Russian*]: Today's statement by the representative of Israel is typical on two scores: first, there is no reference in his statement to any intention on Israel's part to withdraw its forces from Lebanon; secondly, his statement clearly reflects Israel's designs on southern Lebanon and Israel's notion that it can there promulgate its own régime. This once again confirms the propriety of the Soviet delegation's raising the matter. Indeed, it is time the Council seriously considered how to force Israel to withdraw its troops from Lebanon.

68. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The representative of Israel has asked to exercise his right of reply. I therefore invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

69. Mr. BLUM (Israel): It is indeed not my intention to be drawn into a debate by the representative of the Soviet Union, who uses every opportunity to divert attention from agenda items before the Council. He has now appointed himself to be the official interpreter of my statement. Members of the Council have heard my statement and I think they will all readily agree—with the exception, of course, of the representative of the Soviet Union—that his interpretation of my statement is as accurate as was his presentation of facts before; but then, of course, we have all become accustomed to his customary departures from the truth, and we should have been surprised if for once he had stuck to the truth.

70. We have been told by the representative of the Soviet Union that Lebanon has been discussed in the Council perhaps more than any other issue. I am sure he has checked on his facts—he always does—but then, of course, one should not be surprised. Afghanistan obviously could not be discussed in the Council because the representative of the Soviet Union saw to that. The ongoing massacre carried out in Afghanistan by the forces of his country cannot be discussed in the Council. He has seen to that. Nor can the very strong indications of the use by the Soviet Union of chemical and bacteriological warfare against the Afghan people be discussed in the Council. Instead, of course, it is much more convenient for him to give a distorted presentation of the situation in Lebanon, including what he believes to be the root causes of that situation.

71. Well, Ambassador Ovinnikov, the root causes lie elsewhere. You are familiar with them because your country is directly involved in them. Your country directly and indirectly, through its well-known stooges in the region, which I will not name because all of us know them, has been instrumental in destabilizing Lebanon for a decade and more. Those are the root causes, and you cannot divert attention from them by engaging the Council in your periodic book reviews of American authors. I am sure we all appreciate your book reviews and your recommendations as to what we ought to read and what we should not read. But the time has come for you to recommend some interesting memoirs of the Soviet leadership, which you have not done to date for reasons you would, I am sure, care to elaborate on.

72. All this exposé on the alleged root causes of the situation in Lebanon is given by the representative of a country which over the years has not contributed one penny to the peace-keeping operations in Lebanon and which never supported the establishment of UNIFIL in the first place, or the subsequent extensions of its mandate.

73. Now, this argument obviously was intended to be pre-empted in the statement of Ambassador Ovinnikov. But the facts remain the facts and cannot be explained away. It is standard tactics on the part of Soviet representatives to try and lead a debate on matters, while, when it comes to the financial implications of those matters, they are rather reluctant to join in.

74. I should like to ask one question, in the same vein in which Ambassador Ovinnikov asked it; I will only change one word in that question. How long does he think the United Nations can acquiesce in the ongoing Syrian occupation of Lebanon, which, together with the terrorist presence in that country, is the root cause of the tragedy of that country?

75. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: There are no further speakers. The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-NINTH YEAR

2531st MEETING: 3 MAY 1984

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2531st MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 3 May 1984, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Oleg A. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2531)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:
   Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

The meeting was called to order at 11.35 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of May, I should like to pay tribute on behalf of the Council to Vladimir A. Kravets, representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, for his service as President of the Security Council for the month of April. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Mr. Kravets for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the Council's business last month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

2. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Antigua and Barbuda, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of those countries to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece), and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Jacobs (Antigua and Barbuda) and Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to remind members that in the course of consultations members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Rauf Denktaş in his personal capacity, in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Denktaş, in accordance with rule 39. At the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Denktaş to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Council is meeting today in response to the request contained in the letter dated 30 April 1984 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council [*S/16514*].

5. Members of the Council have before them document S/16519, which is the report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 2 of resolution 544 (1983).

6. The Council will now hear a statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou. I request the Chief of Protocol to escort the President into the Council chamber and to the place reserved for Cyprus at the Council table.

7. It is my honour and pleasure on behalf the Security Council to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus, and to invite him to address the Council.

8. President KYPRIANOU (Cyprus): First of all, Mr. President, I thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to address the Council today. I also thank you and the members of the Council for meeting to discuss once again the situation in Cyprus.

9. The Council has been seized of the Cyprus problem for the last 20 years. I am sure that many members recollect the various deliberations in the Council and

the repeated warnings we have made to the international community with regard to the real threat to the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus —to its very survival as an independent country.

10. I will not go into many details regarding the past. It might be useful, however, to quote from two documents alone. The first document is a letter addressed to the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Inönü, by the then President of the United States, President Johnson, 20 years ago, on 5 June 1964. President Johnson stated:

> "It is my expression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey"—at that time there were the repeated threats of intervention—"is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960.[1] I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the island."

The intention of Turkey at that time, even before then, was more than obvious, more than clear.

11. Now I am going to quote from another document, which showed the complete connivance between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which is the same as the leadership today. It is a United Nations document, a report submitted by the then Secretary-General 19 years ago, in June 1965—well before 1974, before the invasion and the occupation. The late U Thant stated:

> "The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together. . . . Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed"—this is 1965—"to physical and geographic separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy. The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots." [*see S/6426, para. 106.*]

12. There are many documents from which I could quote, but I do not think it is necessary. If necessary, of course, in the course of the debate my delegation can provide many other documents, with similar evidence.

13. I submit that despite the fact that there may have been in the past some doubts regarding the real intentions of Turkey, by now there should be no doubts at all. The doubts of the past, I submit, were unfounded; yet today no doubt can be justified. Actually, now is the moment of truth for all of us—for us who are quite aware and conscious of our historic responsibility towards our country and its very survival. But with all due respect I submit this for the Security Council as well.

14. What has happened throughout these 20 years? Negotiation, mediation, compromise after compromise —no result. I am not talking, as I said before, in detail, but look at the 10 years before 1974. They were quite the same and they resulted, in July and August 1974 and since then, after the invasion, in 37 per cent of the territory of Cyprus being under the occupation of Turkish troops. The Prime Minister at the time of the invasion, the socialist Mr. Ecevit, said that he was invading Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee for the purpose of restoring constitutional order which had been undermined by the *coup* that had taken place.

15. Well, it took Turkey 10 years to restore constitutional order. But in fact, that was not the purpose. It was never the purpose. I do not think the invasion would have taken place if it were not the plan of Turkey to impose partition. I do not think that any of these things that have happened—before and since 1974 and up to this moment—would have taken place unless the plan was to impose partition. What was the reason for trying to change the demographic character of the occupied area by uprooting almost 200,000 people from their homes and installing settlers from Turkey in their place? What was the purpose? Was it to restore constitutional order? Or was the purpose to set up separate institutions in the occupied area and introduce various other measures clearly aimed—as we repeatedly warned the Security Council, the General Assembly and the international community as a whole—at implementing a plan which had already existed for a long time? So to take the attitude that we can still have doubts today about the plans and intentions of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots is, I submit, quite unjustifiable.

16. Why are we here today? After 15 November 1983, the date of the so-called unilateral declaration of independence—that secessionist act which was condemned by the international community as a whole—we were promised that some effort would be made to reverse this train of events, that the international community would take steps to stop this catastrophe for Cyprus and reverse what had happened at the expense of the territorial integrity and the very existence of a small Member of the United Nations.

17. What was the outcome? The Secretary-General made a proposal to the Turkish side to freeze that process, despite the fact that the resolution of the Security Council called for reversal. The Secretary-General asked the Turkish side for a freeze, and their answer, apart from documents—let us not be overly concerned with documents today—to the Secretary-General, to us, to the Security Council, to the international community, was: "We do not care what you say. We will exchange ambassadors." Indeed, they have exchanged ambassadors and in the most ceremonial way dismissed whatever the Security Council said and whatever the Security Council stands for. Any lack of action on the part of the Security Council from now on, or anything which may again be regarded as tolerance will not make the situation any better: it will make it much worse.

18. On this occasion the warning is slightly different from that of previous occasions. The warning here is that we as Cypriots and as members of the Government of Cyprus—and I as President of the Republic of Cyprus fully aware of my responsibility—see coming the end of Cyprus as an independent State unless the Security Council acts quickly and effectively.

19. If this situation is allowed to continue, the very *raison d'être* of the United Nations will not only be undermined but will ultimately be destroyed. We have come here because we need the Council's assistance. If we maintain the attitude that still prevails in the world today, so many years after the Second World War and despite the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on Human Rights, resolutions of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and so many other declarations, I am afraid that solutions will be imposed by force and not arrived at through common sense, logic and principle.

20. I admit that we are weak, that we cannot fight—at least not without assistance—to restore our rights. On the other hand, we long for a peaceful solution; we do not want further violence and fighting. Why are we weak? Because we are militarily weak. But are we to be punished for that and to disappear as an independent country? What will be the future of many other countries in the world if the Council supports efforts to dispose of Cyprus? What will happen then?

21. Naturally, the international community and the United Nations through its organs have repeatedly called for negotiations—originally for mediation, later on for negotiations; since 1975 for intercommunal talks; then for the good offices of the Secretary-General, and so on. What has been the result? What has happened?

22. In 1975—after the invasion and the occupation—being weak in every respect, we would have been entitled to take the line of refusing to negotiate unless and until the occupation troops had been withdrawn. The international community agreed that the occupation troops must be withdrawn but declared that in the meantime we should try to negotiate. We did just that—on and off for 10 long years. While we were negotiating—through intercommunal talks, good offices and other initiatives– the other side, pretending that they were interested in such initiatives, proceeded with the implementation of their plan.

23. As the Council knows, in addition to the good will we showed throughout those 10 years, we accepted positions that had been unthinkable in the past. In the course of this process, we repeatedly advanced proposals concerning an overall solution to the Cyprus problem. We arrived at two high-level agreements within Cyprus, the purpose of which, by the way, was, *inter alia*, to exclude secession and division. We accepted federation as a solution to the internal structure of the Cyprus problem, something which, because of the realities in Cyprus and because of the size of Cyprus, had been unthinkable in the past and excluded by all British constitutional experts during the colonial period. What else can we do?

24. Recently, even after the so-called unilateral declaration of independence, I made another proposal for an overall solution to the Cyprus problem embodying a completely new framework, which I submitted to the Secretary-General [*S/16549, annex*]. I did not do it for propaganda purposes; that is why I did not make it public, as others might have done—although I do not think there is now any reason not to make it public. I say this not because I entertain any hopes in that connection—and I shall come to this, together with other statements we have made in the past—but so that the international community may see to what extent we have gone in our sincere desire to ensure a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. I shall request our delegation to ask the Secretary-General to distribute that proposal to the members of the Council and of the United Nations.

25. We are convinced that the good will we have shown and all the concessions we have made—compromise after compromise—given the lack of effective action on the part of the international community, have not done any good; they have done much harm. They have strengthened the intransigence of the other side, which has found negotiations, intercommunal talks, good offices and initiatives very convenient. "Let us get engaged in these things but, at the same time, pursue our plan." That is what the other side has been doing; it has been pursuing its plan.

26. Of course, I realize that it is normal practice in bodies like the Security Council, from time to time, to hear counsel and advice to be calm and moderate. But I am afraid that Cyprus could be finished and would still be asked to be calm and moderate. There is no longer any room for that.

27. The signs are quite clear. The Security Council in its resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983 called upon the Turkish side to reverse their 15 November declaration. Did they do so? They announced the holding of a referendum in August for the purpose of approving a new constitution for the so-called separate independent entity, the occupied part of Cyprus; they decided to hold elections in November to elect the new president and organs of the so-called independent Cyprus. On the eve of the visit of the Secretary-General's representative to Cyprus to assess what was happening with regard to his efforts, Ankara and the illegal régime in the occupied part of Cyprus proceeded to a formal exchange of ambassadors. What else does the Council need by way of a message from these people? Is there anything else to be added? They made it clear to us a long time ago, and I am sure that by now they have made it clear to everyone.

28. They have now started talking again about high-level meetings, about talks and initiatives. What do

they want to achieve? Obviously, they want some kind of machinery which would mean recognition of some sort. And then they would perhaps want other kinds of initiatives to pursue the same plan: "Let us keep the international community asleep, pretend we are interested in this and the other, but pursue our plan."

29. The Cyprus problem is not an East-West dispute. Quite frankly and realistically, I feel that in that sense it is not a complicated issue; it is something on which the international community agrees.

30. The problem is whether this agreement by the international community can be implemented; for what will happen to Cyprus if it is not implemented, and what will happen to other countries that might find themselves in similar circumstances sometime in the future?

31. Not only are they trying to ridicule the Security Council—I am sorry to say this, but the Council really is being ridiculed, having taken a decision in November providing for a course of action, when they do exactly the opposite. They presume that they can dictate their terms not only to us but to the entire international community.

32. I am going to convey to the Council another message they are sending to us and to the Council. I am going to quote a spokesman of the so-called Government in the occupied area; I am sure that members will get the message. He said, "We will make the Greek Cypriots"—meaning the Cyprus Government—"pay for appealing to the Security Council." We are not even allowed to appeal to the Council any more. Do you realize what point we have come to? This meeting of the Security Council is in no sense a formality; it is of a decisive, determining character. The spokesman went on to say that "The cost of their action"—our action is to come to the Council, here, today—"will be the opening of a part of Varosha to the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots within a short time"—in other words, to colonize another occupied part. By the way, they have in mind not only Turkish Cypriots; they already have quite a few thousand from Turkey over there.

33. This spokesman of the so-called independent Turkish Cypriot State goes on: "Each time that the Greek Cypriots"—meaning the Government of Cyprus—"have appealed to the United Nations Security Council or the General Assembly they have paid a price for it. Here is the declaration of our republic; here is our flag;"—they have made a flag—"here is the declaration of the dates for the presidential and parliamentary elections; and here is the latest move to open Varosha to the Turks."

34. In all humility I ask, are we entitled to come to the Council and appeal to it? It seems that we should be afraid to do so, that we are not entitled to do so. There may be many other violations of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations of which the Security Council and the General Assembly have been and still are seized, but I believe—and I stand to be corrected; I may be wrong; I am not absolutely certain—that this is the first time that a Government has been threatened with retaliation if it comes to express its views to the Security Council. That is the stage we have reached.

35. There is a question about who is more to blame: Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot leaders. I do not think there is any difference. I believe, in fact, that the answer is Turkey, because the actions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership have all along been in conformity with the policy of Turkey. Let us also be practical: none of this would ever have happened without the occupation of 37 per cent of the territory of Cyprus by Turkish troops. That is the reality, and if we are going to find a way out of this situation the reality must be seen, and the action that should be taken must be taken in the light of that reality.

36. The Council may ask us again to be calm and moderate—to do what? It may ask the Secretary-General to continue with his good offices. It is obvious from the Secretary-General's remarks in his report of 1 May [*S/16519*] that when, in diplomatic language, he cites the need to "revitalize" those good offices and calls for "political support" he means, in my view, much more than that; he means action by the Security Council.

37. But, once again speaking frankly and thinking aloud, I ask: in the present circumstances, what would anyone expect the Secretary-General to do? Should he make other proposals less acceptable to us, other proposals that would be contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations? That would be unfair to him.

38. Therefore, we have nothing against the good offices of the Secretary-General, but if there is going to be any result, we must bear in mind that simply saying "good offices of the Secretary-General" really contributes to the plan of the other side to try again to use those good offices—as indeed they have done with all other procedures—as a means to pursue their plans while pretending to co-operate. There is no room any more for any repetition of these developments.

39. We want a peaceful evolution. But how can one hope that there will be a reasonable arrangement which would ensure, on a lasting basis, peace and security in Cyprus and in the area in general unless the Turkish side—that is to say, Turkey primarily, and, of course, the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots—is made to accept in practice the revocation of what they have done, to abandon the plan for partition? Let us face the truth; let us face the reality: if there is no abandonment of the partitionist plan there can be no peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. It is as simple as that, and I am sure that members realize it. What do some people expect us to do? Just to slide along with events and allow the situation to continue until partition is final and, perhaps, until other measures are taken, until everything is irreversible? For our part, we shall do whatever we can not to make it irreversible, but

I submit that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to see to it that its own resolutions are implemented.

40. Mr. President, as I said before in the course of the debate, our delegation will be at your disposal to provide whatever other views are necessary, both in terms of further evidence regarding the expansionist and partitionist plans of Turkey, and in terms of other matters pertaining to the Cyprus problem, especially as it stands today.

41. But again, with all due respect, I should like to put before you this question: is there any doubt in the minds of anyone as to the real intentions of Turkey? If there is doubt, let us continue with the debate and establish whether doubt is justified or not. We are ready to do that for as many days as are necessary, for as many weeks as are necessary, because, as I said before, it is not out of formality that we are here today. The second very pertinent question which arises is, will the Security Council allow, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of its own resolutions, the gradual disappearance of Cyprus as an independent country? These are the issues before the Security Council.

42. It is not a question of details. We are not disagreeing with the other side on certain minor constitutional problems. We do not have any dispute with regard to secondary matters. It must be understood that we are working at cross purposes: we are working for the unity of the country in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations, and they are working for the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus, with partition perhaps as a first step. It is not a question of disagreeing here and there; it is not a question of lack of modalities or of lack of procedures or of any differences of opinion on matters which are not so essential or basic to the survival of a country.

43. It has been 10 years since the invasion. I remember 1977, when the then President of the United States sent a special emissary to Cyprus to meet the late President, Archbishop Makarios, in an effort to persuade him to make far-reaching proposals regarding biregional federation—which in fact he did. The understanding was that there would be a positive response from the other side. Nothing of the sort happened.

44. Let us go back a little further. Let us go back years, to the time of the mediation by the United Nations, to Mr. Galo Plaza and his proposals, before the invasion 10 years ago. Again, those proposals were rejected by the Turkish side, not because they were unreasonable, but because they did not serve the purpose of partition, of Turkish expansion. Since then, how many efforts have been made either through United Nations bodies or through the Secretariat, and with what result? There has been no positive result whatsoever. It is not that there is no way of communicating. It is not that I refuse to meet with Mr. Denktaş—I do refuse, after what he has done, and I will not meet with him unless he reverses what he has done. The least we, for our part, can do is show some political resistance to this attempt to destroy Cyprus in broad daylight and before the eyes of the international community. But there is still nothing difficult about communicating. That is not our problem. Our problem is, what do we do in order to stop this trend of events and to reverse what has happened if we are really and sincerely interested in ensuring the independence, unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus?

45. I do not want to take up more of the Council's time. I would simply like to conclude by once again drawing to the attention of all the Council members the real—the very real—danger to Cyprus and to its very existence. If you now allow the impression to be given that the Security Council will continue to be tolerant, that it will just adopt a resolution and then wait and see, nothing positive will happen and we shall, at the same time, have additional negative developments. It may even be that we may reach a time when it may be too late for the Security Council to act. And if it is too late, then for us, of course, Cyprus will be lost. But the Council will, through its condoning, its tolerance, its lack of action, become—whether we like it or not, and we do not like it—an accomplice to what has been happening at the expense of Cyprus.

46. It was not my intention to use harsh language, but, instead of reading from notes, I wanted to tell you exactly how I feel, how I see the situation. I appeal to you, Mr. President, and to members of the Council urgently to put an end to the situation. Through concerted and other action the Security Council must do whatever it can. I repeat once again: this is not a problem of East-West relations. For the Council, for the United Nations, it is a simple issue of freedom and peace, of justice, of the principles of the Charter. For the Council it is a matter of its own resolutions, the implementation of which is the only way to ensure a process towards a peaceful evolution that would, in turn, ensure the independence, unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, its non-alignment and its continuation as a Member of the United Nations.

47. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The next speaker is Mr. Rauf Denktaş, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in his individual capacity in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

48. Mr. DENKTAŞ: Mr. President, members of the Security Council, I thank you all for giving me the opportunity to put forward the views of my people. I must also thank Mr. Kyprianou for having convened this meeting, because it appears that this is the only way for my people to have its voice heard and to have its case put. It seems that every time the Turkish people of Cyprus breathes as a political body, every time they act as a political body—for no people can live in a vacuum,

and we have to act as a political body—the Security Council will be convened and we shall face the General Assembly.

49. It is my privilege to appear before the Council. I feel it my duty to restate facts which I am sure the Council knows. It is a good thing to remind Mr. Kyprianou of them also. He purposely suffers from amnesia, because his mind does not go back beyond 1974.

50. The Cyprus problem did not start in 1974. The sovereignty, the independence, the territorial integrity of Cyprus were attacked by the Greek Cypriot leadership, who had formed secret armies and had well planned the attack in advance, in order to destroy the bi-national character of the State, with a view to annexing the island to Greece. Greece was fully behind this conspiracy and helped the Greek Cypriots to do what international agreements told us not to do —namely, to destroy the bi-communal partnership of the State and to make it a Greek State. So, if I take some time in looking at the facts, I ask that I be received with patience.

51. When Mr. Kyprianou pleads for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, he is seeking from the Council a mandate to continue what they tried to do between 1963 and 1974—namely, to end the bi-national character of the State. That is the mandate he is seeking.

52. We have done nothing against the territorial integrity of Cyprus. It was my people that was attacked in 1963 and that was forced to live in little enclaves, defending itself against the illegal administrator, called Archbishop Makarios, while Mr. Kyprianou here, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was dismissing one by one Turkish Cypriot representatives who had to be at foreign embassies and was Hellenising, as he said, the administration of Cyprus. That is what he now wants to consolidate; that is what they have tried to consolidate for years; and that is why the struggle has continued.

53. Amnesia will not save Mr. Kyprianou from the sting of conscience, because I am sure this Organization will not wish to be misinformed and will not be satisfied with half the news, half the facts, but will want to know all the facts before condemning the Turkish people of Cyprus to servitude under the Greek Cypriots.

54. We have established the independent Republic of Cyprus as equals with the Greek Cypriots. The sovereignty of Cyprus was given to the two peoples of Cyprus to cherish and respect, but in the course of my appeal to the Council I shall prove that at the time they put their signatures to the agreements they had already decided to use them to destroy it and to further the struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece. We are guilty because we defended ourselves. Had we not defended ourselves, had we submitted to the rule of Archbishop Makarios after he destroyed the bi-communality of the country, of the State, of its Government, Cyprus would now be part of Greece. To them it is liberty, freedom; to us it is colonization. That is where we clashed. That is where the clash is.

55. Mr. Kyprianou demands from the Council the right for the Greek Cypriot majority to be able to decide the destiny of Cyprus. He has no such right under the international treaties, which they have flouted without fear for years, trusting that misinforming the world assembly would lead them to final victory. He now sheds crocodile tears, because he sees that merely misleading the world assembly takes people nowhere. He has suggested that we are flouting the Security Council. We are too small a people to do that. What we are defying is the attempt by one section of a bi-national country to deceive the world assembly, to deceive this body, by falsehoods.

56. I am a lawyer by profession. It is my duty, when any court of law is misled into giving a wrong judgement, to appeal and to seek justice for my client. In this political forum there is no right of appeal, except the decision, the courage to continue to struggle for freedom and to tell the people all the time that the struggle is to cherish the Charter of the United Nations and not to become colonized by Greeks in Cyprus, until this is understood and decisions are changed.

57. We are accused of dividing Cyprus because we did not allow Greek Cypriots, with 20,000 troops from Greece, to occupy Cyprus and to annex it to Greece. We are accused of partitionist tendencies because there came a moment in our history, in our struggle, when we saw that resisting the union of Cyprus with Greece was costing the lives of our people. So we said, "Since two peoples live in Cyprus, let us divide it. Since you want to be united with Greece, let Greece take you to its bosom, but do not take us with you." That is how partition arose. There was no deliberate partitionist policy. Partition was our defence, our only reasonable civilized alternative to *enosis*.

58. I have asked the Greek Cypriots to confirm in words and deeds that *enosis*, union with Greece, is not in their plans. What have they done? I will tell the Council in a moment.

59. Instead we are told by the Prime Minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, immediately after his accession to power in October 1981, that the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper, which forms the basis of our negotiations for a bi-zonal federal republic, is an imperialist plan, and he urges the Greek Cypriot side to reject it. Then, in February 1982, he comes to Cyprus and he gives a speech in which he says, "This is part of the national territory of Greece", and he vouches that he will help the Greek Cypriots get rid of the Turks in Cyprus. On 28 October 1983, Mr. Papandreou again refers to Cyprus as part of the national territory of Greece.

60. In 1964, the elder Papandreou, his father, was hand in hand with Archbishop Makarios in attacking the international agreements that had created the binational Republic of Cyprus, a *sui generis* State, a partnership which could continue only as long as the agreement which created it was honoured. But Greek Cypriots destroyed it. We defended our rights, and in November 1964, while Turkish blood was flowing in Cyprus and the union of Cyprus with Greece was the aim of all, Andreas Papandreou said, "The union of Cyprus with Greece will be the union of two Greeces." So we were living in Greece and we did not know it. Cyprus was Greek; Cyprus was Greece. It was our fault, it was our sin, that we did not accept that Cyprus was Greek. We do not accept it now. We shall never accept it. That explains the crocodile tears. "There are two Greeces. Now we shall make them into one." That is why the Cyprus problem has not been settled: because we did not allow Cyprus to become part of Greece. On 4 March 1982 *The Cyprus Weekly*, a Greek Cypriot newspaper, criticizes Papandreou for having said this.

61. During his recent visit to Cyprus, the Prime Minister of Greece rekindled the dormant Greek Cypriot wish for *enosis*, union with Greece. This is what we are facing. We were pushed into declaring our statehood in order to prove to Mr. Papandreou and to Mr. Kyprianou that in Cyprus there exists a Turkish people that will never allow Cyprus to be the second Greece in the Mediterranean, that will never allow Cyprus to be united with Greece and that has entrenched itself within its 1960 status and rights in order to help re-establish a bi-zonal federal republic.

62. We move from father to son. On 27 October 1964, in a speech given at the University of Salonika, Mr. Papandreou says, "All Greek Cypriots are for *enosis*. Cyprus must become the springboard for the dreams of Alexander the Great in the Orient." We have prevented this. We are guilty. We shall never be forgiven. And the Council is asked in the name of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus—by those who have tried to destroy that sovereignty and territorial integrity—to punish us, to condemn us and to make us the servants of Mr. Kyprianou. That is what is being asked of the Council, and I am sure it will not accept it.

63. Quotations are plentiful, and we shall come to them one by one.

64. When did the Government of Cyprus break down? I shall quote from the Secretary-General's report of December 1964:

> "One basic set of obstacles stands in the way of the solution of such problems: the claim by the Government"—the Greek Cypriot administration—"on the one side, that Turkish Cypriots should submit to its authority and to the law; the position of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, on the other side, that, pending a final settlement or a return to the Constitution, the authority of the present Administration ought not to be recognized by members of its community." [*See S/6102, para. 175.*]

The writ of Makarios ceased to be a legal, judicial writ as soon as the bi-communality of the country was destroyed in December 1963.

65. I have watched Mr. Kyprianou very carefully. He has done his best to dramatize the situation, and he has told the Council that the independent Republic of Cyprus will be destroyed if it does not act and, I suppose, if it does not punish us. I have listened to him carefully in order to discover the grave developments or the threat to peace on which he has based his request for the convening of the Council. I have learned nothing, except that we have made our unilateral declaration of independence, that the Security Council has condemned us and that from that day on we have not reversed our decision.

66. The last time I addressed the Council [*2500th meeting*] I told it that the request that we reverse our position was a request to destroy a living political body. In that body my people has its rights and status, which are underlined by the 1960 treaties, which Greek Cypriot arms tried to destroy and in defence of which we lost 103 villages and 107 mosques and lives in the thousands; in defence of which my community was put to the torch for 11 years—which Mr. Kyprianou forgets because he was busy here, trying to deceive the whole world. He had to shut his eyes to what was happening on the island.

67. So what is the position in Cyprus? We have declared our statehood, and we have said frankly that we have done so in order to put an end to a stalemate that has been continuing for 21 years. For the first time I have heard Mr. Kyprianou complain about that stalemate, a stalemate they have created and will continue to create as long as they are treated as the legitimate Government of Cyprus.

68. All Council members represent Governments here, and I ask them: in whose Government is one fourth of the community put outside the budget, outside the administration, outside the protection of the State, treated as a rebel—not just for a couple of months but for 20 years—with attempts made to take away all its political and constitutional rights? Yet this Council, where the protection of human rights is the utmost concern, where the sanctity of international treaties is very important, is still asked to condone all that was done to us.

69. We are, in line with our rights and our status as co-founder partners of the bi-national State of Cyprus, living in the north as a result of 11 years of untold misery and attack and denial of justice by Greek Cypriots from 1963 to 1974, having been liberated just in time by Turkey, as a guaranteeing Power. We are ready to re-

establish the federal Republic, for which there exists an agreement, a formula and a procedure. We have been inviting the Greek Cypriot side to come to the table and negotiate and to leave these one-sided complaints and resorts to international forums where, in most cases, we are not even heard; but they do not like that table: inter-communal talks can only lead to the re-establishment of a bi-national State. Why should they come to the table when they are treated as being in charge of the whole of Cyprus, its legitimate Government and its only people? Would you come if you were given this advantage, and the other side, which you have been trying to destroy for years, was doing its best to save its rights and no more? What alternative was left to us after being treated the way we were for 20 years by the Greek Cypriot side?

70. So I call upon him to come to the negotiating table in order to establish a bi-national, bi-zonal federal republic, in accordance with my agreement with Archbishop Makarios [*see S/13369, para. 51*] and his endorsement of it in 1979. For doing so, for his coming to the table, I have said that I am not asking him to recognize my State, to recognize me as the President of that State, as I do not recognize him as the President of the whole of Cyprus and as I do not recognize his as the only people in Cyprus.

71. We met Archbishop Makarios as the representatives of two peoples, as the leaders of two peoples. When I shook the hand of Archbishop Makarios on our first meeting, he said, smiling, "Mr. Denktaş, you know that I do not recognize you as the President of the Turkish administration."—it was "administration" then. I replied "Of course, Archbishop, I do know that, and you know that I do not recognize you as the President of Cyprus." The man smiled, said "Yes, I do." We sat down and we started talking. The present Secretary-General was a witness to all these things. Then I met Mr. Kyprianou. When we met I did not meet the President of Cyprus and he did not meet the President of the Turkish Cypriot administration. We met as the two representatives of the two peoples. After the declaration of our statehood, I called for a meeting with him in our capacities as the representatives of the two peoples; I continue to keep the door open and he says he will not meet me until I reverse the decision of my statehood.

72. That decision is not mine. I cannot reverse it. It is a decision of my people, which has suffered for 20 years, lacking liberty and freedom, struggling in order not to lose its identity and status, dying in order to prevent Greek Cypriots from destroying the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, from making it a land attached to Greece. They have declared it; more than 83,000 signatures were there to verify it on the day it was declared.

73. So what is our fault now that we have all of a sudden decided to have a constitution, to put it to a referendum, to have elections? We did not decide this all of a sudden. This was all decided on the day we declared independence, that this was the procedure to be followed. My community is accusing me of delaying the finishing of the constitution, of delaying the referendum and the elections. They say that I am doing this deliberately in order to give the Secretary-General time to intervene and to stop the whole process. I have promised them that is not so. We are moving slowly because we want to test the Greek Cypriot side as to whether they will come to their senses and realize that Cyprus is Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot, whether they will accept the 1977 formula [*see S/12323, para. 5*], whether they will come to the negotiating table. That is why we are moving slowly. But it appears that each time we take the natural step of establishing another missing link of our statehood, we shall be brought here in order to defend ourselves.

74. In Cyprus there is no crisis. In Cyprus there can be no crisis, because the Greek Cypriots live, prospering immensely, in the south. They are deriving all the benefits of their false pretence that they are the Government of Cyprus by getting all the international aid and credit. They are becoming richer and richer. If they have any financial difficulty it is because they are spending more than they should on arms and armaments for a reason that we neither know nor understand, because we do not intend to settle the Cyprus problem by arms. We have no claim and no aim on the south of Cyprus. It is they who claim the right to come and rule us. We have no such claim. In the north, since liberation by Turkey, we have been living in dignity, without fear, in freedom, having established our democratic procedure.

75. We are ruling ourselves, as we have done since December 1963, when we were thrown out of the Government, out of the organs of State. Therefore, when Mr. Kyprianou sheds crocodile tears for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, I have to put on record that morally he is not the President of the whole of Cyprus, because he has not been elected in accordance with the 1960 Constitution. Legally and constitutionally he is not the President of Cyprus because that Constitution is in the dustbin. His is not the Government that that Constitution foresees. That Constitution foresees a Government in the organs of which Turkish Cypriots participate fully. We were thrown out of that bi-national Government on 31 December 1963, and we have not been allowed to go back unless we accept the Constitution as not being there, that the amendments that they thought they should make have been made, and Turkish rights have been abrogated. We have not submitted to this, and therefore Mr. Kyprianou has no right to talk about defiance of the Security Council, defiance of international law or anything of that kind. He is not here with clean hands, and he cannot blame us for defending ourselves, for not submitting to him.

76. The *coup d'état* by Makarios against the bi-national character of the State was not successful be-

cause we did not submit to him, because he never took possession of Cyprus as a whole. That *coup d'état* has been simmering until today, and the same pretense continues.

77. What I regretted most about Mr. Kyprianou's statement was the part where he said that he was not ready to meet me and that he saw no purpose in meeting me. I repeat, the Cyprus problem will be settled by the two peoples. I met the Greek Cypriot leaders only twice in the last 20 years, in the presence of the Secretary-General. On those two occasions we succeeded in coming to a conclusion and in finding a formula for settling the Cyprus problem. I want to meet Mr. Kyprianou again because they have been running away from that formula for the reasons I have explained, and I believe that if we face each, if I can prove to him why we have been pushed into this corner after 20 years and what we expect of Cyprus in the future—if I can convince him—we can come to an agreement. This offer is there, but he says he cannot accept it unless I withdraw the declaration of statehood.

78. Has he stopped any of his activities under the assumed title of Government of Cyprus? He has not. He is all over Europe trying to punish my community, trying to impose an illegal embargo on economic activity, accusing us falsely, the way he has accused us today, of trying to partition the island just because we did not allow him to take it all. We have asked him to stop these activities in order to show some good will to my people. No. He is the Government of Cyprus and he will continue as such until the end.

79. I understand why he is reluctant to meet me. He is reluctant because Mr. Papandreou, the Prime Minister of Greece, has told them and keeps on telling them that intercommunal negotiations will not bring justice to Cyprus. On 24 November 1983 Mr. Papandreou said: "We can hold negotiations only for a unitary Cyprus. For us, neither federation nor confederation is an acceptable solution." During the last four months Mr. Kyprianou visited Athens 14 times for instructions, the last time with all the party leaders. Had we acted similarly they would have circulated letters saying, "Look at Denktaş, the tool of Ankara". No, we do not do this; they do. But what is the direction they get from Athens? Is it not clear? I repeat the same quotation: "We can hold negotiations only for a unitary Cyprus. For us, neither federation nor confederation is an acceptable solution." And the Secretary-General is asked to use his good offices within the agreed context, namely for a federal republic, to help the parties, and we are supposed to defy the Secretary-General and place his efforts in difficulty when all that we are doing is trying to be helpful to him and show him that Greek Cypriots are not on that track and that therefore this train will not go to the federal republic station. I repeat: during the last four months, 14 visits for aligning the Cyprus policy—and this is what they call the Hellenic Centre's view—on the talks. Is it we who do not want the Secretary-General, in whom we have the utmost trust? Is it we who create difficulties for him? Or is it the Greek Cypriot side, which never wants intercommunal talks, taking full advantage even of our right to make counter-proposals when something is put before us?

80. I have been talking to the Secretary-General. He had never given me anything on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, because he knows that that is not part of his good offices function. He is not a mediator. He has always said, "May I have your views on it?" I have given my views on it, after consulting with my people. But I must not do so. Why? Because the moment I see the Secretary-General Mr. Kyprianou makes a statement in Cyprus: "This is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If Mr. Denktaş makes counter-offers he has destroyed the initiatives of the Secretary-General." That is what he says, but it does not accord with the facts of life.

81. So why are we here taking up the Council's time? On 18 December 1983 Mr. Kyprianou stated his policy:

> "In order to make the Turkish Cypriots retract their illegal attempts, we are not only going to continue our internationalization of the question, but we are going to increase our attempts. World public opinion has to be convinced that the Cyprus question does not need a theoretical solution to the problem, but a practical, decisive and just solution must be found. That is why we are here. Not because there is a crisis, not because there is a grave situation."

Part of the internationalization programme is being put into effect, and they will come again and again to the United Nations in order to get resolutions which, if implemented, would do to my people what their guns and economic embargoes have failed to do. That is what they want; they will not be satisfied with less.

82. I must thank the Secretary-General for giving full publicity to all my letters in his latest report [*S/16519*]. In them the Council will find comprehensive suggestions and transitional suggestions for the settlement of the problem. This is not disrespect for the office of the Secretary-General or for the Security Council; this is not evidence that we do not want to negotiate. It is clear evidence that we are fully in the negotiating process, that we want the negotiations to continue under the agreed terms and that we are not running away from negotiations.

83. It is therefore my objective to try and be helpful to the Council and to the Secretary-General with regard to his call for the reactivation of the negotiating process. In his report the Secretary-General says:

> "The Security Council entrusted the mission of good offices to the Secretary-General in 1975 and has regularly extended it since then. It is for the Council now to assess the present situation and to decide what action needs to be taken to revitalize the search for a peaceful settlement and to provide it with the necessary political support. I am convinced that this

search is vital to the interests of all the people of Cyprus as well as to the wider peace." [*Ibid., para. 24.*]

84. I have tried to tell the Council why the negotiating process has not been successful. It cannot be successful as long as the Council continues to treat one of the parties to the problem as the legitimate Government of Cyprus when that party lacks all the fundamentals of legitimate government. A government in a bi-national State 100 per cent of whose organs are Greek Cypriot cannot claim to be the legitimate Government of that State, especially when it has put its hands on that State by armed force, in spite of international treaties registered with the United Nations.

85. Hence the Council has a golden opportunity to tell Mr. Kyprianou that he has to see me, that by seeing me he is not going to concede that I am the president of any State, just as I am not going to concede that he is president of the whole of Cyprus, and that it is the wish of the Security Council that such a meeting take place. Dialogue is the only way to peaceful negotiation. Picking up faults here and there and running away from dialogue is an indication that they are satisfied with what they have—and why should they not be satisfied, since they have the title of Cyprus in their pockets unjustly and can deceive the world that Turkey has invaded Cyprus?

86. I shall briefly refer to some of the things he has said. He referred to Galo Plaza, saying that we had refused to accept his report. In fact, Greek Cypriots were the first to reject Galo Plaza's report because he was not giving them *enosis* immediately but was delaying it for some time. We rejected his report because he should not have publicized it; he should have allowed time for the parties to look at it and enter into negotiations. But from the memoirs of the notorious terrorist Grivas we read years later that:

> "In the last days Girgotis has learned that Dimis Dimitriou is a close friend of Galo Plaza. Following this, Dimis Dimitriou was requested to ask Galo Plaza what sort of a secret proposal he would be making for a solution of the Cyprus problem. Dimis Dimitriou had a meeting with Girgotis on 1 October and gave this information: Galo Plaza intends to give a report in line with the solution envisaged by Greece, even if his report is to be thrown into the waste-paper basket. And he is surprised that we"—the Greek Cypriots—"have not implemented a military administration and have not united with Greece in the economic field."

87. This is the mediator of the United Nations, and we are asked to accept any mediation report, no matter what kind of a report it is, even one which assails our liberty and condemns us to servitude. I shall not embarrass the United Nations by reading out further from this report; but I recommend that it be read. Grivas conspires with a friend of Galo Plaza and they send Galo Plaza to Beirut for entertainment to his liking.

88. We respect the Security Council. We have the highest respect for the Secretary-General, and we want his good offices to continue. But please allow us to defend our rights as best we can.

89. Mr. Kyprianou said that we had threatened him with retaliation if he came to the Security Council. I reject what he has read. It may be a commentary by a Greek Cypriot writer on what the spokesman said. I have no recollection of such a statement by the spokesman. Mr. Kyprianou misunderstands what we are trying to tell him when we implore him: Do not take this matter to the Security Council; this is a matter on which we can talk and must talk; that is what the international community wants. He takes this as a threat. We also tell him: you have no legal feet to stand on in that Security Council because one of your feet is missing and that is the Turkish foot. You have to be bi-national in order to be there; there has to be a Turkish Cypriot representative sitting with you so that you can be representing the Government of Cyprus. Where is that representative? They have dismissed all Turkish representatives in the foreign service: in Moscow, in London, in Washington, in New York, in Egypt. They have dismissed them all. When did they do this. Not after Turkey came; not after we declared independence: they did it in 1963 and 1964.

90. His assertion that everything has been planned by Turkey for the partition of the island and that step by step we are going in that direction is a remarkable one. If Turkey has a plan for partitioning the island, then Mr. Papandreou and the Greek Cypriot leadership must be in conspiracy with Turkey, because for the last 20 years they have constantly been giving Turkey and us every opportunity to divide the island, by treating us as non-existent in Cyprus, by trying to destroy us, and by forcing us to put a line between ourselves and their attacking forces. They must be in conspiracy with Turkey to bring about that partition.

91. But that we were not so planning is obvious from the records of the Secretaries-General over the years. In 1963, when they attacked us, all our civil servants were ejected from the services. We tried to have them accepted back. On 10 September 1964, in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated the following:

> "The UNFICYP [United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus] authorities, from the beginning of their mandate in Cyprus, gave serious consideration to this question and on several occasions raised it with the Cyprus Government. All negotiations on the possible re-employment of the Turkish Cypriot civil servants in Nicosia and their financial compensation from January 1964 have so far ended in a deadlock, as the matter is considered by the Government to be highly political and closely linked with the final set-

tlement of the Cyprus question." [*See S/5950, para. 108.*]

92. For 21 years, because there has been no final settlement of the Cyprus question, these people have been out of all the organs of the State, while a 100-percent racist Greek administration has been claiming the right to be the Government of Cyprus. Can we, therefore, accept Mr. Kyprianou's version of events? He accuses us of creating separate institutions in all spheres. We are proud that we did so. When we were thrown out of our own State organs we had to survive and live as civilized people; we had to provide for administration and administrative setups; we therefore looked after ourselves. We have learned very well how to look after ourselves; we now want them to share the experiment with us by establishing a federal republic.

93. He says, "I, as the President of Cyprus, see the end of Cyprus as an independent country". Well, it is because he looks at Cyprus without constitutional authority as its President that he sees this destruction, and because he has amnesia and forgets 1963 to 1974 he does not realize that the death-blow to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus was dealt when they attacked us in 1963 and refused to incorporate us, in spite of repeated reports and repeated endeavours by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. We were not born yesterday, and I am sure that all members know the background of the Cyprus problem.

94. "We are militarily weak," he says. "We cannot fight. We want a peaceful solution. Are we to be punished because we are militarily weak?" This is an accusation against Turkey of invasion. Turkey came to Cyprus and drove back an invasion by Greece and its adherents in Cyprus. That is what Turkey did, nothing more, nothing less. And now, like the criminal who is caught by the police, the criminal is complaining. "But the police were fully armed; they had all their men around us. Is this justice? Is this fair?"

95. We have stopped them from destroying our country, a bi-national State, and we are giving them the chance to re-establish it. And in the presence of the Council he is refusing negotiations, he is refusing a dialogue, and he is asking the Council to punish us for not submitting to violence and to the destruction of international treaties. I hope the Council sees how he is playing his hand.

96. He also stated something which I have to correct. He said, "Recently I made an oral proposal to the Secretary-General; I did not make it public because it was sincere." He said that this would be distributed later by his mission. When that proposal is distributed I shall beg leave to tell the Council why we rejected it. The Secretary-General, at Casablanca, gave me the gist of it. He could not read me the proposals in full. Later, when I met with the Secretary-General again I said to him, "Mr. Secretary-General, I have now discovered the full text of Mr. Kyprianou's letter to you. Why did you not give it to me in full?" His answer was, "I knew that you would reject it totally, and it is not my purpose to give parties what they will reject; I try to find something that they could accept. That is why I did not give it to you."

97. How did the Secretary-General know that I would reject it? Because Mr. Kyprianou's offer, which he says he will provide to the Council, did not fall within our agreed solution or within our agreed procedure. It was an offer by the "legitimate Government of Cyprus" to a "rebellious minority". Mr. Kyprianou has to come down to earth. We are his partners. We are part of Cyprus. We want to live in Cyprus in peace and understanding. We have not been able to do so intermingled, because of their *enosis* theory and their *enosis* policy. We want to live side by side and to be partners in a joint venture in the form of federation.

98. I am very sorry; I see members looking at their watches, but this opportunity is given to us very rarely. I shall try to finish as soon as possible.

99. With regard to the exchange of ambassadors, Mr. Gobbi was shocked because of what I did. We were shocked when we heard that Mr. Gobbi was coming on the day he did. We were both caught by surprise. There was nothing deliberate in it; it was an activity of a body politic in which we delayed what we could not stop, and you cannot fix dates for this kind of ceremony all the way and all the time. It had to be done, and, I repeat, it was not deliberate; it was not a slap in the face to the Secretary-General, as Mr. Kyprianou has suggested.

100. When I had met the Secretary-General earlier —and he will confirm this—and he asked me about this freezing of certain activities, I told him frankly: "Mr. Secretary-General, there are activities which we can delay and which we can stop. There are activities which we cannot stop. I shall try to help you as much as I can. That promise stands. But if you are going to ask us to freeze ourselves, I must say that I have not yet seen any frozen Government, nor any frozen State, except, perhaps, for Alaska. It is impossible. Please ask us reasonable things and we will do them—and the most reasonable thing you can ask us is to sit at the negotiating table and to talk, and talk and talk."

101. How can I give a guarantee to Mr. Kyprianou when I talk to him on the first day and the first month that there will immediately be a solution if we have not yet come to the same point of view that Cyprus is not Greek; that Cyprus shall not be Greek; that there shall be guarantees against union with any other country, in whole or in part, and that the bi-zonal federal system must be the aim of both sides? If we do not agree on this, if he pretends to be the Government of Cyprus and its President, and if he says that he sees Cyprus being destroyed, the Cyprus he sees being destroyed is a Greek Cyprus. That is the Cyprus he sees destroyed. But Cyprus is not Greek; thus Cyprus is not being destroyed.

102. We are trying to establish a partnership. We are ready for one, but at the table, not running around the world spending the little money we can afford in order to defend ourselves against imagined and imaginary accusations. We are as good a Government as his. He is not treated the way we are, and the more glory to him. But please, Mr. Kyprianou, do not destroy us. We have stood our ground and defended ourselves. We do not ask you to reverse your decisions; we ask you to correct them in the light of facts. We ask for your compassion for people who have fought for their liberty for 20 years, for people who have been buried in common graves just because they happened to be Turks; yet they did not submit.

103. Please understand us: we are not trying to destroy anything. We are trying to prevent our destruction as one of the peoples of Cyprus, as one of the co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus, and we cannot accept the fact that just because Archbishop Makarious, by force of arms, destroyed the partnership in 1963 we therefore have no right at all to claim justice from you.

104. Mr. Kyprianou lives under the impression that we are for partition. I assure you again that we do not have any such intention or any such plan. I ask him to state again publicly that the decision of the Greek Cypriot House—a decision which is still valid, to the effect that the struggle shall continue until the union of Cyprus with Greece is achieved—has been wiped from the books, that he does not want the union of Cyprus with Greece and that he agrees that the national guarantees against it shall continue. I invite him to do that, and I invite him to the table once again.

105. If I have taken more of your time than I should, I repeat, I rely on your compassion and understanding and on the fact that we are one of the two sides in Cyprus, one that has been silenced for years. I trust that you will therefore forgive my indulgence. I thank you, Mr. President, and all the members of the Council for having allowed me to speak.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

NOTE

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2532nd MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 3 May 1984, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Oleg A. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2532)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:
   Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

1. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2531st meeting I invite the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to take places at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Antigua and Barbuda and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Iacovou (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Jacobs (Antigua and Barbuda) and Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Afghanistan in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The Security Council will now resume its consideration of the item on its agenda. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Antigua and Barbuda. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. JACOBS (Antigua and Barbuda): Mr. President, may I offer you my congratulations on your assumption of your important position and say that I am confident that your skill, charm and experience will no doubt assist you in guiding the deliberations of this body successfully.

5. I have asked to speak in this debate on Cyprus because my Government considers it of paramount importance that the world community fully understand that small countries, such as Antigua and Barbuda, view the circumstances of Cyprus with grave concern.

6. The invasion of Cyprus in 1974 by Turkey and the occupation of 37 per cent of its territory was in itself an act of utter disregard for the principles of international law and the traditions of international practice. But Turkey added international insult to global injury when it ignored General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling upon it to withdraw from Cypriot territory. Over the years Turkey has challenged the effectiveness of this Organization by treating its resolutions with contempt while tightening its stranglehold on Cyprus by exporting its own Turkish citizens to Cyprus, by illegally distributing houses and lands owned by expelled Greek Cypriots and by imposing its own currency as legal tender in that part of Cyprus which it continues to occupy.

7. In an attempt to encourage a solution to the Cyprus problem, many countries turned a blind eye to these excesses by Turkey in the hope that intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would produce a viable framework for the stable and peaceful development of all the Cypriot people in the context of

secure national independence. Alas, this was not to be, and a principal contributor to the failure of these intercommunal talks was the continued presence of Turkish forces on Cypriot soil, for, as I had occasion to remark in the General Assembly last year, "No people can reach a lasting solution to their internal problems if external forces exert undue influence on one side or the other."

8. On 15 November last year, even as the nations of the world were looking forward to a winter of progress in renewed intercommunal talks following last spring's serious attempt by the United Nations to establish a framework to settle the Cyprus problem, the Turkish Cypriot leadership shocked us all by declaring occupied Cyprus an independent State. I can think of no words that more graphically describe this act than those used by the Cypriot President when he addressed the General Assembly one week after this disturbing development. He said:

> "The bogus entity set up by Turkey in the occupied area has ... legally no territory except the territory controlled by the Turkish occupation troops. It is therefore the offspring of aggression and the result of a continuing criminality".[1]

9. The Security Council recognized that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was invalid and contributed to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus. On 18 November, just three days after the unilateral declaration of independence, the Council adopted resolution 541 (1983), which deplored the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus. Within a week the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at New Delhi denounced the declaration as legally invalid and reiterated the call for its non-recognition and immediate withdrawal. The European Economic Community, at the level of the Council of Ministers, last month repeated its condemnation of the unilateral declaration of independence and went on to express its regret that Turkey had decided to accord recognition to this illegal entity.

10. World opinion on this matter has seldom spoken with a more unified voice. The people of the world are tired of strong-arm tactics by the big over the small. They are fed up with continuous violations of international principles and practices. They are disturbed at the spectre of global chaos which such behaviour portends. It is crystal clear that the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots is being told that the world will not accept the unilateral declaration of independence. It is crystal clear that the Government of Turkey is being told not to encourage and protect such a flagrant violation of international law.

11. The Secretary-General has laboured hard and long on this matter, and he deserves the admiration of us all for his tireless toil in a vineyard which has offered few fruits. It is right that the Security Council should request that he redouble his efforts, for there have been some encouraging signs. The public statement of the Cypriot Government and the concessions that it is prepared to make offer at least an opportunity on which to build. But the Council must not be content merely once again to throw the Secretary-General to the wolves. He must enter the arena clothed in some armour against those who would make light of grave international injustice. In this context the Council must now call for effective sanctions against the bogus Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and equally, it should urge sanctions against those States which would seek to give comfort and relief to the illegal Government.

12. It may appear that the problems of Cyprus should hold little concern for a Caribbean island separated from it by so many oceans. But that perception would be wrong, for injustice is real, however far away it may be perpetrated, and illegality remains illegal, whatever the distance of its occurrence. In these circumstances the people of Cyprus share a common bond with the people of the world, and every man has a sacred duty to safeguard that bond. But my country is also a small island State, like Cyprus. We too are vulnerable to the adventures of larger and more powerful States. Therefore, in calling for justice to be done in Cyprus we are doing no more than calling for justice for all small and vulnerable States, such as our own.

13. We are reminded of the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., who said in another context, but with equal compulsion: "A threat to justice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." We look to the United Nations for such justice. We look in particular to the Security Council. In this context we urge that it act for the legitimate State of Cyprus and, by so doing, act for the world.

14. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The next speaker is the representative of Turkey.

15. Mr. KIRCA (Turkey) [*interpretation from French*]: At the beginning of my statement permit me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Personally I hold you in great respect. You are one of the most capable and pleasant personalities it has been my honour and pleasure to encounter in the course of my career. Furthermore, I wish to reiterate publicly at this time that my Government attaches primary importance to its policy of good-neighbourliness in relations between our two countries. I should also like to congratulate the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. Vladimir Alekseyevich Kravets, who so skilfully guided the Council's work last month.

16. Before I come to the substantive part of my statement I should like to declare, on the express instructions of my Government, that Turkey has serious reservations with regard to the Secretary-General's report of 1 May 1984 [*S/16519*] as a whole, as well as on certain passages therein. However, out of deference to him and

to his mission of good offices, my Government prefers to discuss the matter with him through the normal diplomatic channels.

17. The Security Council is meeting once again to discuss the question of the independence of the Turkish State of Cyprus at the request of the Greek Cypriot administration.

18. On 17 and 18 November last year [*2498th and 2500th meetings*] I had the opportunity to express the views of my Government on the question. At that time my Government informed the Council of its decision to reject resolution 541 (1983) in its entirety and of its desire to continue recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The reasons behind this are very simple and I shall, with the Council's permission, set them forth briefly.

19. Following a series of unilateral actions, towards the end of 1963 the Greek Cypriot community overthrew the legislative, executive and judicial organs of the Republic of Cyprus as they had been established in the unalterable Basic Articles of the 16 August 1960 Constitution, thus violating the Treaty of Guarantee[2] of the same date, for the purpose of robbing the Turkish community of the island of its status of co-founder of, and equal partner in, the Republic and relegating it to the position of a persecuted, exploited and dominated minority.

20. That *coup d'état* totally upset the political equilibrium that had been established between the Turkish community and the Greek community on the island. Never in the history of Cyprus has the Greek community obtained *de jure* or *de facto* the position of ruling majority *vis-à-vis* the Turkish community. There has never been either a majority or a minority in Cyprus. The historical truth is that two national and quite separate communities have continued to coexist on the island. Each one of these two communities is nothing but the extension of a nation whose spiritual identity and collective soul were forged throughout centuries of history. The very unusual context of relations between Turks and Hellenes has required and continues to require the establishment of a political equilibrium based on the idea of equality between the two nations—Turkish and Greek. When Turkish and Greek statesmen deserving of the name prepared and signed the 11 February 1959 Zurich Agreement[3] and, with the co-operation of the United Kingdom, the 19 February 1959 London Agreement,[3] they laid the foundations for that intercommunal equilibrium, just as the more general equilibrium between Turkey and Greece and the Turks and the Hellenes in that part of the world at the time had been established by the 24 July 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty.[4] The Constitution and the Nicosia agreements of 16 August 1960 in fact only set down in detail the principles that had already been worked out between Turkey and Greece.

21. Hence it is only in that historical context that one can have a true picture of the question of Cyprus. And the question of Cyprus can be resolved only in the context of respect for the equality of the two great Turkish and Greek peoples, which must everywhere coexist peacefully in friendship, actively co-operate at all levels and together nurture this incredible wealth of common characteristics and values, finally burying all enmity, rivalry and squabbles inherited from the past.

22. Ever since the *coup d'état* of 1963 the Turkish Cypriot community has continued its struggle in order to regain its status as an equal partner in the Cypriot State, thanks to the unwavering support of Turkey.

23. As long as the attributes of that status are not restored and recognized as envisaged in the Treaty of Guarantee, the proclamation of independence of the Turkish cypriot community is perfectly justified on moral and juridical grounds based on the right to self-determination it has already exercised on an equal footing with the Greek community of the island, on the principle of self-defence and, lastly, on the principle according to which anyone whose rights are trampled upon may under international law resort to retaliation. Indeed, that act was not one of secession, since it was aimed only at reaffirming the equal status of the two communities and since it can be revoked once the two communities reach agreement, within a reasonable period of time, to restore and restructure the State organs of the Republic within the framework of a bicommunal and bi-zonal federation, as was stipulated in the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 [*see S/12323, para. 5*] and 19 May 1979 [*see S/13369, para. 51*], agreements which were referred to in the Secretary-General's opening statement of 9 August 1980 [*S/14100, annex*]. Furthermore, at the political level that decision had become inescapable.

24. Intercommunal negotiations were resumed in September 1980. The Turkish Cypriot community then submitted a comprehensive plan. Later, it accepted the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper of 18 November 1981 as being one of the major elements constituting the basis on which the talks should proceed.

25. During these negotiations, which could have continued regularly and in a serious manner geared to eventual success on this mutually agreed-upon basis —that is, the high-level agreements, the opening statement of the Secretary-General and the "evaluation" paper—the Greek Cypriot administration took advantage of every possible opportunity to interrupt and delay them, since the purpose of the Greek Cypriot administration and its constant accomplice, Greece, was to do away with the Secretary-General's opening statement and "evaluation" paper. On this point, I refer members of the Council to my letter of 9 May 1983, contained in document A/37/809, which faithfully reproduces the exact chronology of the negotiations.

26. To achieve that goal, the Greek Cypriot administration brought the matter to the General Assembly, in violation of its commitment under the high-level

agreements not to attempt to internationalize the problem. On 13 May 1983 the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/253, which the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey immediately rejected *in toto*. That recommendation—a masterpiece of bias, distortion of historical truth, and disregard for the elementary rules of international law, in particular of the principle of the inviolability of treaties—exasperated the Turkish community.

27. At that point it became convinced that as long as it waited and refrained from restoring itself to a position of equal footing with the Greek Cypriot community there could be no chance of convincing the Greek Cypriot community to negotiate seriously with a view to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting solution. That is why it decided to declare its independence. Mr. Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has reiterated this once again: unless there is a final agreement on a federal solution, that decision is irrevocable. Also irrevocable is Turkey's decision to recognize the new State. Anyone who knows a bit about the Turkish people will know that its determination cannot be broken and that that people refuses to yield even an inch on problems concerning national honour, whatever the designs of those who would exert pressure; they will no doubt come to understand, as they have in the past, that their mistakes are equalled only by their ignorance.

28. On 18 November 1983, the Security Council, following the example of the General Assembly, adopted resolution 541 (1983), a biased, unjust and untimely resolution. How could it be expected that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey could come to terms with a recommendation which, on the basis of the Treaty of Guarantee, deplores the independence of the Turkish community? The Security Council, like the General Assembly and the majority of States Members, did not even remember that Treaty when, from late 1963, the Greek community was trampling on the Cypriot Constitution, which had been established and guaranteed by international treaties, when it was persecuting, plundering and massacring the Turkish community, or even when an internationally notorious murderer seized power on the island in 1974 with the assistance of Greece in order to achieve the island's final union with that country. How could they heed the representatives of States which are always ready to preach to one and all the primacy of the rule of law and to counsel moderation to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot peoples when they themselves are responsible for having cast the Treaty of Guarantee into oblivion and for being the accomplices of the usurper, recognizing it as the legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus and recalling the Treaty only in order to deplore the Turkish community's cries of exasperation.

29. We are here again today because of amazement at the fact that the Turkish Cypriot community now has its own flag and its own national hymn and is about to have a new Constitution and to organize new elections. Why this excessive agitation? These are not even symbols specific to independence. After all, this meeting is taking place in a country where states of the federation, counties, municipalities and even administrative units have their own flags, and where it is usual for each of the states of the federation to have its own constitution. Indeed, the organization of elections is the duty of a democratic State which respects human rights. Why is there such emotion when the new State exchanges ambassadors with mine; this is a routine affair between States which recognize each other as such.

30. Apparently, the critics do not want the new Turkish State to consolidate its independence. But it will continue doing so, with the full support of the people and the Government of Turkey, and, as long as it requests it, under the protection of the Turkish armed forces.

31. Yet the new State has not failed to put forward very constructive proposals aimed at bringing the Greek community back to the intercommunal negotiating table; among them were those of 2 January and 18 April last. These proposals, unfortunately, received no positive response from those to whom they were made. In that connection, I wish also to state, on express instructions from my Government, that at no time has Turkey agreed to support or to encourage any proposals, ideas or suggestions other than those officially put forward by the competent authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

32. I wish also to stress another point: no pressure —whether by Governments or by parliaments—can break or bend the determination of the Turkish people to support their Cypriot brethren. Until they are renounced totally, these pressures, these "conditions", will, unfortunately, constitute a major obstacle in the quest for a final solution to the Cyprus question.

33. It is quite possible to convince the Turkish community not to establish its independence definitively. But that result cannot be achieved by pursuing a policy of ostracism and isolation against it; it already possesses a framework within which it can be secure and certain to be able to live in perfect happiness, proudly enjoying full national identity.

34. Those who wish to prevent the Turkish Cypriot community from progressing on the path of independence are taking the wrong approach. They ought rather to make it clear to the Greek Cypriot administration and to Greece that they hold the key to reopening the path to the re-integration of the Turkish community into the Cypriot fold. They must therefore consent to resume the intercommunal negotiations, without thereby implying that they recognize the independent Turkish Cypriot State, under the auspices of the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General entrusted to him in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 367 (1975), "on a mutually agreed basis," which is the terminology used by the Secretary-General, with a

view to reaching a comprehensive settlement within the framework of a bicommunal, bi-zonal and non-aligned Cypriot federation based on the principle of equality between the two communities on the island, Turkish and Greek.

35. In this connection I should like to reiterate that my Government continues to support the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. My Government is also of the view that the interlocutors of the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring about a resumption of the intercommunal negotiations are, within the context of his mission of good offices, as always the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community.

36. Let the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots indulge themselves in their continual dream that one fine day the miracle they so desire will come to pass and that Turkey and with it the Turkish Cypriot community will succumb to one sort of pressure or another or even that Turkey will sink into such decadence that pan-Hellenism can once again attempt to invade the Turkish territories that are still labeled on official maps as "lost Hellenic provinces". If they can be satisfied by such ridiculous illusions, they can go on harbouring them for as long as they like, even to the end of time. It is up to wise and well-intentioned third-party Governments to do what is necessary to make them see reason and face up to realities, rather than pamper them in their insane dreams and allow them to remain bogged down in the unreality of their myths and fictions.

37. I repeat, there is no way other than intercommunal negotiation; there will be no final solution other than one that recognizes for the Turkish community of Cyprus its status as co-partner, on an equal footing, in a bicommunal, bi-zonal and non-aligned federation.

38. I reserve my right to speak again during the course of these discussions if I deem it necessary.

39. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The next speaker is the representative of Greece, upon whom I now call.

40. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council for acquiescing to my request to participate in this debate. Before embarking on the subject of my statement, I should like to congratulate you warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the current month. Your vast experience and personal finesse and your sense of tact, as well as the fact of your speaking with the authority of the country you represent, constitute the grounds for our confidence that you will guide the deliberations of the Council with wisdom and efficiency. I would be remiss were I to fail at this stage to congratulate Mr. Kravets for the excellent manner in which he conducted the business of the Council during the past month.

41. The Security Council is meeting again to deal once more with the almost perennial—unfortunately—question of Cyprus. The reasons for which the Council has dealt with the matter so many times in the past result from the threat of the use of force and the use of force proper by Turkey against the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

42. In his address this morning [*2531st meeting*] President Kyprianou presented a clear, balanced and honest picture of the situation in Cyprus and of the perspectives and possibilities for a fair solution. My Government fully endorses and supports the views expressed by the President of the Republic of Cyprus.

43. At this stage I should like to confine myself to a few remarks which reflect the basic philosophy of my Government with regard to the question of Cyprus and the situation this problem is creating in the entire region.

44. In flagrant violation of all norms of international law Turkey in July 1974 invaded the Republic of Cyprus. As to the Turkish contention that their invasion was based on the Treaty of Guarantee, this has been repeatedly rebutted with valid legal arguments such as those that appear, *inter alia*, in the records of the 2405th meeting, paragraphs 154 to 156. Under the dome of the Charter there is no room for military action against an independent sovereign State Member of this Organization.

45. Since that time the United Nations has deplored in numerous resolutions the continuing military occupation of part of the Republic of Cyprus. In his turn the Secretary-General has taken many initiatives in his indefatigable efforts towards bringing the parties together at the negotiating table. Unfortunately, those efforts have all failed because Turkey has been unshakeable in its position that a solution should be based on the principle of equal partnership in sovereignty over the Republic by the Greek and Turkish communities, which constitute respectively 80 and 18 per cent of the Cypriot population. Equally unshakeable has been Turkey's position that the Turkish community should control a territory twice the size of what its population ratio would justify. So Turkey plans to achieve both: territorially, the partitioning of the Republic of Cyprus and, constitutionally, the co-ownership of the whole of the Republic on a 50-50 basis by the two communities, one representing 80 per cent and the other 18 per cent of the population. Moreover, Ankara insists that the whole arrangement should be guaranteed by Turkey. Allow me to submit that if this were to happen the independent Republic of Cyprus would for all practical purposes be turned into a protectorate of Turkey. This would be the first step towards total subordination of the Republic to Turkey.

46. What has happened in Cyprus has, in our view, very little to do with intercommunal differences. It would indeed be inconceivable if minority communities were allowed to request the military intervention of foreign Powers in order to acquire disproportionate

status within a State. If this principle were to be accepted I am afraid that most of the States Members of the United Nations could be dismembered. If it were for the people of Cyprus to find a bicommunal balance within the framework of internationally accepted patterns, I do believe this goal could have been attained in a matter of a few weeks. However, the problem of Cyprus stems directly from Turkish expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean and the so-called geopolitical interest of Turkey in Cyprus. In view of this reality, whatever happens in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus is, we believe, the sole responsibility of the Government of Turkey because Ankara is the authority which totally controls militarily that part of the Republic.

47. So Turkey alone bears the responsibility for the unilateral declaration of independence of the Turkish Cypriot pseudo-State. Turkey has the sole responsibility for permitting the announcement of elections for its consolidation, an act which, *inter alia*, runs counter to the provisions of Security Council resolution 541 (1983). Turkey also bears the sole responsibility for the purported exchange of ambassadors, again an act violating that resolution. These acts by Turkey are not only in violation of the Charter and international law in general, and in particular of resolution 541 (1983), but are also a manifestation of disrespect for the Secretary-General's recent initiative aimed at bringing the parties together at the negotiating table.

48. The Secretary-General, who, understandably, is very cautious in his utterances, could not help saying in his recent report that he had authorized the following statement:

> "The Secretary-General deeply regrets the ceremonies"—the exchange of ambassadors—which took place today in northern Cyprus and Ankara, respectively. The Secretary-General has instructed his Special Representative, Mr. Hugo Gobbi, to transmit immediately to those involved his great concern over these developments, which have placed in jeopardy his current efforts." [*See S/16519, para. 20.*]

49. One could speak for hours and hours about the various aspects of the Cyprus problem. The only hope for a speaker is to address the common sense and experience of the representatives in the Security Council. It is in this spirit that I dare say that the omens are not favourable for the independence of Cyprus and for peace in the region. Turkey is acting with provocative arrogance, an outgrowth of its military might. It seems to us strange indeed that a country which relies heavily on foreign aid to maintain its military apparatus is permitted the luxury of spending more than $200 million a year to maintain its occupation force in the Republic of Cyprus, against international law and against the resolutions of the United Nations. I submit that this is a fact which should be of crucial concern to the countries that lend their support to the Turkish military machine.

50. President Kyprianou this morning made a genuine and honest appeal for a peaceful solution to the problem of Cyprus. On behalf of my Government I join in the appeal of the President of Cyprus to the Council to examine ways and means to help the Government of Cyprus to restore the exercise of the sovereignty of the State all over the Republic, because, as President Kyprianou said, what is at stake there is the very survival of an independent sovereign State Member of the United Nations, and to a great extent the hopes for the survival of the State rest with you—members of the Council.

51. My Government is deeply preoccupied by the continuation of the situation in Cyprus. We really believe that if the Council fails at this juncture to check the steadily increasing provocations and acts by Turkey against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, the options for a peaceful solution to the problem will dangerously shrink.

52. The Government of Cyprus has repeatedly stated that it is willing to participate in a fair compromise. However, what Turkey is asking for is an unconditional surrender, on the basis of its military might. This is a development that we shall never accept. In view of this situation, I should not be exaggerating in saying that Turkey, with its acts against Cyprus, is indeed endangering peace in the island, thus aggravating the situation in a region already overburdened with tensions and conflicts.

53. In this context I should like to express—I think it is appropriate—our deep appreciation of the mission of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This appreciation is addressed particularly to the States that contribute men and material to the maintenance of the Force. UNFICYP has proved to be an invaluable factor for the safeguard of peace in the island. I can say with a great degree of certainty that but for the presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus, peace would have been gravely endangered.

54. Before concluding I should like to refer to the famous theme of *enosis*—the union of Greece with Cyprus—on which the Turks have been harping for many years. On 18 October 1983, in reply to certain allegations of this nature by Turkey, I sent a letter to the Secretary-General which was circulated as document S/16079. I should like to quote from this letter, because it gives a definitive reply to the famous allegations that Greece is seeking *enosis* with Cyprus. The letter says:

> "It is a historical fact that, in the 1950s, the people of Cyprus were struggling for self-determination, the realization of which might have led to a union with Greece and that Greece had supported this anti-colonial struggle. In 1960, a historical compromise was reached, whereby a sovereign and independent Republic of Cyprus was established. The Greek Government has always adhered to this compromise, notwithstanding the initial reaction of a part of

Hellenic public opinion. This reaction has since completely subsided, and any reference to the goals of the anti-colonial struggle of the people of Cyprus during the 1950s is of a purely historical nature and can in no way be construed as constituting a policy statement. The people and the democratic Governments of Greece have genuinely accepted and have been unwaveringly supporting"—and will unwaveringly support—"the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. If there is a country that is violating each and every one of these principles, it is Turkey, by its invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and by its continuing occupation of one third of the territory of the Republic."

Invoking the famous theme of *enosis* is like calling a shadow of the past into existence to justify the crimes of the present.

55. I trust that no matter what the Turks say they will fail to blur the fact that Turkish troops occupy part of the Republic of Cyprus, and that they will fail to refute that the question of Cyprus is one of foreign occupation of an independent, sovereign State Member of this Organization, which is why the question of Cyprus is brought before the Council.

56. Mr. KRISHNAN (India): Allow me to state, at the very outset, how pleased my delegation is to see you, Sir, presiding over our deliberations. We congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. Our two countries are bound by close ties of friendship and multidimensional co-operation. Your own personal charm, high competence and long and varied diplomatic experience are too well known and I do not need to dwell on them at any length. Those qualities shall surely stand us in good stead during the Council's consideration of urgent and critical issues. I extend to you, Mr. President, the wholehearted co-operation of my delegation in helping you discharge your onerous responsibilities. Permit me also to express a word of sincere appreciation to Mr. Vladimir Kravets of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for his very competent and dignified stewardship of the Council during the month of April.

57. Barely five and a half months ago the Security Council met to discuss the situation in Cyprus, in the wake of an event which caused shock and consternation the world over, namely, the unilateral proclamation of a so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. That action, which was denounced in most capitals of the world, infinitely complicated an already serious situation in Cyprus and caused a severe setback to the painstaking efforts, made over several years, by the Secretary-General to promote a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus question through intercommunal dialogue. At the time, my delegation spoke before the Council [*2498th meeting*] and I had occasion to express the profound shock and concern with which the Government of India had learnt of the unilateral declaration of independence. We deplored that action, which was in violation of the declarations of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Cyprus.

58. On 18 November 1983 the Security Council adopted resolution 541 (1983) in which, *inter alia*, the Council deplored the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus; considered the declaration to be legally invalid and called for its withdrawal; called upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus and requested the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus. The resolution further called upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation and called upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices.

59. We had hoped that the almost-universal denunciation of the action taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 541 (1983) would have made wiser counsels prevail and would have encouraged a process of restraint and reversal so that the grave situation already created would be alleviated. We were somewhat heartened to learn subsequently of the talks initiated under the auspices of the Secretary-General on the basis of ideas put forward by him to both sides in January of this year. We were hopeful that the willingness of both parties to undertake a fresh dialogue and the presentation of proposals by them would presage a reduction of tensions and an honest effort to work out a negotiated settlement which would, *inter alia*, involve as an indispensable element the freezing and eventual reversal of the unilateral action taken by the Turkish Cypriot side.

60. Against that background, it is particularly unfortunate and regrettable that further actions should have been taken by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community in direct contravention of resolution 541 (1983) and the Secretary-General's endeavours. As we are all aware, on 10 April 1984 the Turkish Cypriot leaders announced that the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus intended to conduct a constitutional referendum in August and elections in November 1984. On 17 April ceremonies took place in Ankara and Nicosia which were publicly described as constituting the submission of "credentials" for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Those actions —not to mention other steps such as the adoption of a separate flag, anthem, etc.—flew directly in the face of the provisions of resolution 541 (1983) and of the Secretary-General's call to "freeze" the unilateral declaration of independence. As the Secretary-General himself observed, those actions placed in jeopardy his current efforts.

61. My delegation has listened with great attention to the address delivered this morning before the Security

Council by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou. President Kyprianou has presented his country's case before the Council in poignantly lucid terms. Having listened to his statement, we are able to appreciate to an even greater extent how critical are the circumstances that confront Cyprus today. The unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of a Member State of the United Nations are under serious threat. Fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and espoused by the Non-Aligned Movement are at stake.

62. President Kyprianou has warned us that, if the process set in motion last November is not reversed, the partition of Cyprus will become inevitable and Cyprus as a unified island entity will cease to exist; the responsibility for this would rest squarely with this Council and especially its permanent members. His urgent appeal to the conscience of the world community cannot go unheeded. We must and shall come forward with an adequate response.

63. I have listened with care to the statements made by other representatives today. I have also followed with close attention the statement made to the Council by Mr. Denktaş, as representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. My delegation has always advocated that the legitimate rights of the Turkish Cypriot community should be respected and defended. However, we do not see any force in the arguments advanced to justify the series of illegal and unacceptable actions taken. We have always believed that the Cyprus question needs to be resolved in a peaceful manner and without delay. An equitable solution has to be found by which the people of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish alike, as partners sharing a common destiny, can live in dignity, with equal rights and in friendship and harmony in an undivided country. We have consistently pointed to intercommunal negotiations as the only possible means towards this end. Nevertheless, the actions taken over the past six months by the Turkish Cypriot community, in spite of professions to the contrary, can in no way promote such negotiations; indeed they have served only to bring them to a complete halt.

64. It is true that the negotiations have been long and protracted, often frustrating and frequently stalemated. This is not surprising, given the history and complexity of the problem and the deep-seated suspicions and mistrust which have grown over the years. But the way to stimulate these negotiations is not by creating conditions which make the continuation of the negotiations impossible. If the dialogue is to be revitalized, surely it can be done only by renewed commitment and not by actions and measures leading to a division of the country which would render further talks irrelevant.

65. To make a unilateral declaration of independence and to take steps which are claimed to be "in implementation of the natural and legal consequences" of that declaration is to destroy the very basis on which the dialogue is predicated. We have taken due note of Mr. Denktaş's assurance to the Council that he is not seeking the partition of the country, but the course that he has now taken would appear to go just in that direction.

66. The report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/16519 describes the efforts he has made in pursuance of the resolutions of the Security Council, including resolution 541 (1983). As the Secretary-General himself has stated in his report, "The developments outlined in this report speak for themselves". The exchange of correspondence annexed to the report is revealing. It is clear that the Turkish Cypriot community's response and actions have created a complete deadlock, thereby threatening the very process of communication and negotiations which the Secretary-General has been trying to reactivate and which he has emphasized in his report. On the other hand, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has, in spite of extreme provocation, demonstrated its continued willingness to undertake meaningful negotiations.

67. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has always reiterated its full solidarity with and support for the people and Government of the Republic of Cyprus and reaffirmed its respect for that country's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment. At their Seventh Conference, held at New Delhi in March 1983, the heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries stated, *inter alia*, that "the *de facto* situation created by the force of arms and unilateral actions should not in any way affect the solution of the problem" [*see S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, sect. I, para. 130*]. What was actually happened is a succession of attempts to create *de facto* situations which are unacceptable to the international community.

68. Immediately after the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot community on 15 November 1983, the Prime Minister of India and Chairperson of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, addressed a special message on the subject to heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries. I should like to quote from that message:

> "This unilateral declaration undermines the unity of Cyprus, violates its territorial integrity, transgresses its sovereignty, calls into question its independence and puts in jeopardy the non-aligned status of the island as a whole.
>
> "The Non-Aligned Movement must reiterate its consistent position of principle that force of arms and unilateral actions should not in any way affect the solution of the problem. To this end, our Movement will, I hope, concert action for the revocation of the unilateral declaration and the immediate resumption of intercommunal talks on the basis of the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. The Movement should unitedly back the efforts of the United Nations Sec-

retary-General to ensure respect for the unified status of the Republic of Cyprus."

69. The Government of India deplores the latest actions taken in contravention of Council resolution 541 (1983), in particular the decision involving the exchange of so-called ambassadors between Turkey and the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. We believe that this causes a serious setback to the efforts of the Secretary-General to promote a negotiated settlement. We urge that these latest actions be rescinded immediately.

70. If I may revert to the report of the Secretary-General to the Council, he has, as I noted a while ago, declared that in the present situation, "One important requirement would seem to be the maintenance of a continued process of communication and negotiation." We are in complete agreement with this assessment. We continue to believe that the mission of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General remains the only possible channel through which the two sides could be engaged in meaningful negotiations. In spite of the obvious frustrations and disappointments that have been strewn in his path, the Secretary-General has been good enough to indicate that he is prepared to continue to discharge his mission of good offices as long as there is unambiguous support for it. We believe that the Secretary-General should be requested to persist in his admirable efforts. It would only be appropriate, therefore, for the Council to strengthen his hand. In particular, all States which have influence in the region have a special responsibility, and they should give the Secretary-General active support and reinforce his efforts. They must display greater determination than they have been willing to display so far to ensure that resolution 541 (1983) is respected and implemented.

71. We are under no illusions about the vexed nature of the question of Cyprus, which has now been rendered even more difficult and complicated by recent events. However, the most important challenge before the Council today is checking the drift towards a state of hopelessness. The present intolerable situation must be reversed and a meaningful dialogue resumed.

72. The Government and people of India are bound to the Government and people of the Republic of Cyprus by deep ties of friendship and co-operation. Cyprus, like India, is a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement. All of us in the Movement are firmly committed to lending our full support to the sovereignty, independence, unity, territorial integrity and non-alignment of that friendly country. This is also the objective of the United Nations, and it is the solemn duty of the Security Council to take resolute action in pursuance of that objective. We trust that the Council will find it possible to do so.

73. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The representative of Cyprus wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I call upon him.

74. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): The distortions and outright falsehoods of the Turkish side compel my delegation to exercise its right of reply even though those falsehoods have been repeatedly and fully exposed in past meetings of this Council.

75. As in the past, I consider the statement made by the individual who has appeared under rule 39 as having been made by the Turkish representative, for he who does things through others does them himself. The Turkish fabrications remind me of the saying of a great American President: "You can fool all of the people some of the time, and you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time."

76. The gist of Turkey's policy in Cyprus and the statements heard today in the Council—both of them—is indeed a cynical attempt to fool all of the people all of the time. First let me say that I consider it to be the apotheosis of the absurd when the aggressor, Turkey, the usurper of our homes and lands and the occupier of almost 40 per cent of our territory, accuses its victim of usurpation. To which "usurpation" does the Turkish representative refer? To the usurpation of the country? We are in Cyprus and we shall remain there because we belong there. It is the ancestral home and land for all Cypriots—Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites and Latins. It has been so for centuries. Turkey is the alien and undesirable element in Cyprus. Its presence there, by the Turkish Prime Minister's own admission, is based on expansionist reasons and is intended to safeguard Turkey's security. Imagine, a half million Cypriots constituting a threat to the 45 million Turks.

77. We are here in the Council because we are the sole, legitimate Government of Cyprus. We are a democratic Government at that. We are here because we are duly recognized by the whole world: all nations, all international forums and, gratefully, not by the aggressor, Turkey. Our governmental system is free and not a parody of democracy as is that of the representative of Turkey. We did not expel anyone—least of all any Turkish Cypriot officials—from the Government. The Turkish Cypriot ministers and other Government officials are not, regrettably, at present in the Government. That is not of our own doing or by choice on our part, but because of harassment and intimidation by the aggressor so as to undermine and cause the collapse of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. There are still, however, a few courageous Turkish Cypriots who defied Turkey and remained in their posts. I repeat —and this is the gist of the issue—they were not expelled; they were forced by Turkey to abandon their Government posts by threats to their lives. As a matter of fact, we yearn and struggle for their return. The members of the Turkish Cypriot community were never, and are not today, considered by us as second-class citizens. Our sense of fairness and pride—healthy pride, not like the one invoked by the representative of Turkey, whose pride is directed only towards the violation of resolutions—would not allow it. We repeat that

the Turkish Cypriot community constitutes a precious and inseparable part of the people of our country, and that is how it has been treated. Should our community be let free the world will stand witness to one of the most moving scenes of reunion among countrymen with a common destiny and country.

78. The Turkish representative repeated a number of allegations. Let me start with his reference to the problem itself, the invasion and occupation of Cyprus. Turkey used many pretexts for that act of aggression, which left 5,000 dead and about 1,600 missing and rendered 200,000 Cypriots refugees in their own country. The dimensions of the refugee situation in Cyprus are staggering. Comparatively speaking, they would equate to 85 million refugees in the USSR, 80 million in the United States, 20 million in the United Kingdom, 20 million in France and about 300 million in China. Of course, we heard this morning that there is no crisis in Cyprus.

79. At the time of the invasion Turkey told the world that "a peace operation", as it called it, was prompted by the need to provide security for the Turkish Cypriot community, which, by the way, was neither threatened nor involved in the *coup* and fighting that ensued. Then Turkey, through the mouth of none other than Mr. Günes, the Foreign Minister at the time of the invasion, changed its tune and said on 20 July 1980: "Cyprus is valuable as a right arm for a country interested in its defence and for expansionist aims." "There are those", he continued, "who wish to see the invasion of Cyprus as merely a desire to protect the Turkish Cypriots in the island, whereas the actual problem is the security of the 45 million Turks in their motherland." The words are his.

80. Cyprus is important to Turkey and to any country that harbours expansionist aims. Here in a nutshell is the cause of our tragedy: our strategic importance, which has been a curse for our people. As if confirmation of this fact were necessary, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's statement of 30 November 1983, published in *The Christian Science Monitor*, that "Cyprus is a dagger stuck in the belly of Turkey" updates and reconfirms the expansionist aims of Turkey with regard to Cyprus. This Turkish lie was thus exposed.

81. The argument that Turkey acted in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee also falls flat on its face because, as is well known, Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force in international relations. The word "action" stipulated in article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee cannot be interpreted to mean military action. If it were so, the Treaty would be contrary to the provisions of the Charter and would thus be null and void *ab initio* as per Charter Article 103, which states that obligations under the Charter shall prevail over the obligations of a State under any other agreement.

82. Then it was the Turkish allegation that the aggression was justified in order to re-establish the *status quo*. But years after the return of the democratically elected President of the Republic of Cyprus and of constitutionality to Cyprus, the Turkish occupation troops remain in Cyprus as living evidence of contempt for United Nations resolutions demanding their withdrawal and of Ankara's conviction that the bigger the lie the better the chances of its being accepted.

83. Time and again Turkey has appeared before this forum telling the world community that what it is doing in Cyprus is not designed to partition the island. But the grim record belies the Turkish allegation. This abominable record of Ankara's actions in Cyprus has been fully documented by my President in his statement to the Council. Need I recount the mass expulsions of Cypriots, the colonization of their homes and lands, the further series of further aggressive actions and illegalities, culminating in the secessionist declaration of 15 November 1983 and the recent exchange of "ambassadors" between the culprit and its offspring? Need I refer to the adoption of a flag, to the setting up of a hand-picked "Constituent Assembly" and to the announced decisions for a so-called constitutional referendum and elections?

84. Suffice it to say that the move for a unilateral declaration of independence, condemned by the whole world, made the Government of Turkey look ridiculous, for it will be recalled that when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 it stated quite clearly that it was intervening to restore the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Thus actions spoke louder than words.

85. As a result, we have today a secessionist and illegal entity set up through the barbarity of uprooting the indigenous people, one which is using the Turkish lira, has been integrated into the postal service of Turkey and is running on Turkish time and on water and electricity freely—I repeat, freely—supplied for years by the Government of Cyprus—even after the secession, notwithstanding what members of the Council heard this morning.

86. Even former non-believers admit that they are confronted with an unparalleled case of international deceit. Turkey is now openly and notoriously a renowned international outlaw. But the actions to dismember a small State under the boot of the aggressor are still going on. The so-called elections, a luxury which Mr. Denktaş has been so anxiously demanding of his masters in Ankara in order to maintain himself as so-called President in the occupied areas, are still to come.

87. Elections presuppose a free democratic process. Elections cannot be held under the boots and bayonets of the occupation forces. Elections presuppose territory. Where is that territory? Is it the territory usurped and robbed from its rightful owners, the territory which under international law remains under the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, as is indisputably recognized by international law and confirmed by United Nations

resolutions? Which people will participate? The Anatolian settlers who were brought into Cyprus by the thousands by Turkey after the indigenous population was forcibly uprooted in order to change the demographic character of the island?

88. On this heinous crime of importing settlers, Turkey again gave a series of contradictory answers to the serious charges against it. First, it described them as seasonal workers. When confronted with the question as to how a region with 25 per cent unemployment could be importing labour, it changed its version and added another lie that the settlers were Turkish Cypriots returning to the island. But when again Turkey was confronted with the cold facts, the migration statistics taken by the United Kingdom during the colonial years which proved the Turkish answer utterly false—unless, of course, we were dealing with rabbits—Turkey, like a snail, withdrew into its shell, brushing away any question on this subject with the ridiculous reply that the question of settlers was an internal matter of its puppet régime.

89. Unprecedented in criminality are the illegalities being committed against the Republic of Cyprus: aggression, invasion, occupation, dismemberment of its territory, uprooting of its people and steps to change its demographic character. All these directly affect Cyprus. But this body and the world organization in general are also being victimized and subjected by Turkey to contemptuous treatment. Its decisions are flouted, its resolutions scorned, its edicts torn up by a country with a history of oppression and continuing regressive policies.

90. Reference was made to discrimination against the Turkish Cypriots at the hands of my Government. That is another ludicrous attempt to mislead the world community, for when 18 per cent of the population is given 30 per cent of Government posts, when that 18 per cent has 40 per cent of the police and security posts, as the Turkish community had under the 1960 Constitution, it is strange—indeed, an outright lie—to brand the Government of Cyprus as discriminating against or suppressing the Turkish Cypriot community.

91. The Turkish representative referred to the 1954 to 1974 era. The history of Cyprus is centuries old. But like an amateur surgeon, Mr. Denktaş singled out 20 years of some scattered intercommunal incidents and discarded five centuries of continuous peaceful and friendly relations between our Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. He sought, as always, to create the image of a threatened Turkish Cypriot community, and upon this propaganda he purports to justify his destructive policies, cultivates fear and hate, speaks of graves, warns of non-existent dangers and promulgates division. Whenever cornered, he regurgitates the fear of *enosis*, knowing full well that in 1979 and 1981 the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus by unanimous resolutions ruled out both *enosis* and partition. There is also the 1979 high-level agreement which excludes both *enosis* and partition.

92. Why did the Turkish side mention it? The answer is obvious: in order to mislead the Council, since the Turkish policies are not and cannot be based on truth, moral principles, the Charter, international law and United Nations resolutions. They cannot justify their actions of segregation, partition and division in the enlightened world of the twentieth century. They cannot justify their bantustanization policies. They cannot, I repeat, justify their Ian Smith policy of so-called equality in partnership, meaning that the 18 per cent equals 82 per cent. They cannot justify it, because this theory is unnatural, regressive and unjust. This diatribe was rejected by the people of the country then called Southern Rhodesia. The rejection was also world-wide and absolute. We proudly see today the representative of Zimbabwe, a country which tasted the trials of a unilateral declaration of independence, occupying a seat in the Security Council without the vicissitudes of so-called equality in partnership.

93. The Turkish representative spoke about his favourite subjects, ones he holds close and dear: the alleged intercommunal strife and the so-called suffering of the Turkish Cypriot community. Yes, there were some staged intermittent clashes instigated from outside. Yes, lives were lost—some Greek Cypriot and some Turkish Cypriot. Yes, they occurred during the colonial years and again in 1964 and 1967, when Cyprus was independent. They were instigated and orchestrated by Turkey, a tactic reminiscent of the methods of those who intentionally set fire to someone else's home in order to have a pretext to enter the house and steal his belongings.

94. But beyond the causes of the clashes, is there any Member State in this forum which has not had internal unrest? Is there any State Member of the United Nations or the world community which has not experienced this sad development? I believe there is none. Must we, as a result of internal clashes, justify invasion by a third country, indiscriminate napalm bombing of defenceless civilians, occupation, uprooting of people, colonization of the occupied areas by settlers and the unilateral declaration of independence? I say no.

95. In this very chamber sit the representatives of countries which went through communal strife; thousands upon thousands were the victims, billions upon billions the destruction to property. Should those countries have been dissected?

96. What about the hardships of the Turkish Cypriot community, to which they refer? Why did the Turkish Cypriot community suffer? It was because of Turkey's policies of separation and division, which forcibly segregated, and still segregate, the Turkish Cypriot community from the trunk of the economic and social progress of our people. The words of the sagacious Secretary-General U Thant, the highest independent authority on the question of Cyprus, are again to the point. They were cogently referred to this morning by President Kyprianou, and I shall quote them only in

part: "the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation, imposed by force on the rank and file" [*see S/6426, para. 106*].

97. What is the record of Turkey on human rights, on which it capitalizes with such hypocrisy? Turkey now stands accused in the Council of Europe for violations of the human rights of its own people in its own territory, while it has already been tried, convicted and condemned for systematic, hair-raising, mass human rights violations in Cyprus. What about Turkey and the annihilation of millions of people of other ethnic backgrounds? This is the country which invaded Cyprus to "liberate", and "protect the human rights" of, the Turkish Cypriot community.

98. Turkey complained of "bias" in the Security Council. A host of resolutions and decisions have been adopted in the United Nations on the question of Cyprus. All of them, without exception, vindicate our positions and condemn Turkey. We are not a super-Power; we are not even a Power in the military sense. We have no war machine, nor can we blackmail or intimidate. We rely solely on the merits of our case and on the provisions of the Charter, which we have consistently and faithfully observed. There lies our strength, and upon that strength we carry on, half free and half occupied.

99. Turkey, on the other hand, follows the policy of the big lie. That deceitful policy, and the Turkish expansionism, pursued through division and partition, were and are at the root of the problem of Cyprus. Instead of unity, Turkey pursues division; instead of integration it dictates segregation; and instead of equality before the law it tries to impose privilege and discriminatory arrangements based on ethnic criteria, the latter distorting the principle of equality and thus shaking the roots of peaceful coexistence. Such inequalities strike at the roots of the balance which exists in federal systems and which Turkey so hypocritically proclaims that it supports as a solution.

100. All along, the concern of Ankara has not been the protection or promotion of the Turkish Cypriots at all, but rather their use—or misuse—in order to promote its own aims of partition. In an interdependent world, in a United Nations era, where the obvious and compelling need is for unity if mankind is to survive, the Turkish policy in Cyprus is one of regressive division, bantustanization and outright *apartheid*.

101. Reference was made to the high-level meetings and to the talks. It should not escape the attention of any member of the Council that every time the Turkish side resorts to a unilateral action against the Republic of Cyprus it immediately rallies its resources towards securing efforts by independent authorities aimed at talks and high-level meetings, only to use them to neutralize world condemnation and the international outcry against its illegal actions, and to buy time for its next annexationist step. I remind the Council that this is particularly true in the case of the latest crimes against Cyprus and its people as a whole, namely the purported secession from and dismemberment of the Republic and the so-called exchange of ambassadors.

102. I remind members specifically that in November 1983, while the representative of the Secretary-General was in Cyprus to hand Mr. Denktaş the scenario for a high-level meeting which he himself had requested and which had been accepted by my President, the unilateral declaration of independence was proclaimed. The same pattern was followed this year; the scheme to deceive continues.

103. It was indeed with deep regret that we heard today the insulting and disgraceful accusations made by Mr. Denktaş against a statesman, Mr. Galo Plaza, who has served as the United Nations mediator in Cyprus. Mr. Galo Plaza is internationally recognized as a man of dignity and of high moral standard. He pursued his high mission with great devotion and dedication to the principles of the United Nations. Mr. Galo Plaza studied the Cyprus problem in depth and came to the conclusion that partition would ultimately destroy Cyprus. Such a conclusion, of course, did not please Turkey, which all along had aimed at the partition of Cyprus. They rejected Mr. Galo Plaza's proposals outright, unlike the Government of Cyprus, which immediately accepted them. We are now witnessing an attempt by the agent of Turkey to smear the reputation of the United Nations and its representatives. I hope that members will take due note of the seriousness of this matter and of the ulterior motives behind this attitude. The attempt of Mr. Denktaş to falsify the record on the acceptance of Mr. Galo Plaza's proposals by the Government of Cyprus does not impress me in the least; I believe that, by now, he is in no position to mislead the members of the Security Council.

104. The time has come for the Council to send the right signal to Ankara—indeed, to all potential aggressors. The Charter of the United Nations is quite explicit about the measures to be taken.

105. Ten years ago the Council unanimously found Turkey guilty of aggression and of the occupation of almost 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. It has by now, I am sure, reached the conclusion that the perpetrator of those crimes is unrepentant and that stronger measures, as provided for in the Charter, are long overdue in order to force Turkey to cease and desist its continuing and ever-escalating aggressive actions against Cyprus and its people.

106. We look to the Council confidently, relaying to it the agonizing plea of the vanquished, but not defeated, people of Cyprus, who are crying out for justice and vindication, and are seeking from the Council remedy and redress. With an indomitable spirit the people of Cyprus look to the Council and expect action. They expect a verdict based on international law and the indelible principles of justice and international morality; a verdict based on the Council's own resolutions.

Can the Council afford to let them down? Or, if I may paraphrase, can the Security Council afford to let itself down? I confidently trust that the answer will be a resounding "no".

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

NOTES

[1] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, vol. II, 68th meeting, para. 11.

[2] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

[3] *Conference on Cyprus: Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959*, Cmnd. 679 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959).

[4] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXVIII, No. 701.

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SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-NINTH YEAR

2533rd MEETING: 4 MAY 1984

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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2533rd MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 4 May 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Oleg A. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2533)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:
   Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

1. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: In accordance with the decisions taken at the previous meetings on this item [*2531st and 2532nd meetings*] I invite the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to take places at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Iacovou (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Jacobs (Antigua and Barbuda) and Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Australia, Ecuador and Sri Lanka in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Mr. Albornoz (Ecuador) and Mr. Wijewardane (Sri Lanka) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The Security Council will now resume its consideration of the item on its agenda. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Ecuador. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. ALBORNOZ (Ecuador) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: I welcome you, Sir, as President of the Security Council and thank you and the other members of the Council for affording my country the opportunity to participate in this discussion.

5. The problem that Cyprus has brought before the Security Council is of interest to the international community and a matter of serious concern to Ecuador because it involves principles that constitute the essential bases of our country's international policy and that affect the authority of the Security Council, the primary organ of international law in our time.

6. Those principles are in particular the sovereign equality of States, respect for the territorial integrity of States, rejection of the threat or use of force in international relations, the self-determination of peoples, non-recognition of territorial conquests obtained by the use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These positions are accompanied by our continued support for any action on the part of the international community aimed at achieving the withdrawal of foreign troops from territories of countries not their own. In enumerating in United Nations debates the cases in which such withdrawal has been demanded, Ecuador has always cited the case of Cyprus as well as others elsewhere in the world.

7. The General Assembly and the Security Council have adopted a good number of resolutions in the past 20 years on this issue designed to achieve a just and lasting solution that will not only benefit the Cypriot people but also eliminate a conflict that poses an immi-

nent danger to the peace and security of the eastern Mediterranean region. But unfortunately those resolutions have not been implemented, and that is precisely why there has been continued violation of the sovereign rights of a Member State of the United Nations, which brings us to the situation before the Council today.

8. My country considers that the substantive issue in this crisis, which so seriously affects the Cypriot population *vis-à-vis* its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus, is the need for an understanding between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities—on an equal footing and under the auspices of the United Nations—that will lead to a peaceful settlement of the problem and assure the well being and harmonious coexistence of those communities.

9. Ever since 1960, when the Republic of Cyprus was created, Ecuador, also a democratic country, has expressed its solidarity with it. The 26 March 1965 report by the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, the former President of Ecuador, Mr. Galo Plaza, addressed to the Secretary-General [*S/6253*], indicated the criteria accepted in Security Council resolutions aimed at a solution to the Cypriot problem based on justice and the interests of the inhabitants of that country, a solution based on talks between the two communities that constitute the population of the island, free of the pressure of foreign intervention and under the auspices of the United Nations. There can be no free discussions on the destiny of a people, even when different communities are involved, as long as foreign troops are present on their territory.

10. The stature and integrity of the former President of Ecuador, who was mentioned yesterday morning [*2531st meeting*], are unassailable in view of his extraordinary work in support of the United Nations, not only during the drafting of the Charter at the San Francisco Conference, but also on missions to Cyprus and also to Lebanon and the Congo, not to mention his outstanding work as Secretary-General of the Organization of American States. All this is a matter of history. Moreover, his contributions have been commended in lofty terms by respected, high-ranking figures on the international scene. Mr. Galo Plaza has been a democratic President of Ecuador, respectful of human rights and of the sovereign expression of the will of peoples through free elections, which are the basis of the political fabric of my country, where, in worthy continuation of that process, elections will again be conducted on Sunday next.

11. In his report of 1965 Mr. Galo Plaza demonstrated his absolute impartiality and his desire to find a solution to the problem of Cyprus on the basis of meetings between the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964), and he indicated that any agreement reached by the Cypriot communities must have the support of all the parties concerned. Furthermore, Mr. Denktaş knew Mr. Galo Plaza very well and dealt with him, just as Mr. Galo Plaza also dealt, in Ankara, with the President of the Republic of Turkey, with its Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials of both the Inönü Government and the succeeding administration. Mr. Galo Plaza's report was offered as a "basis for an exchange of views" and recognized that any solution would presuppose concessions on both sides in respect of their initial positions. Anyone who might try to give this a unilateral interpretation should analyse the report objectively; they would find the balance and realism that have been so highly praised by all who have studied it thoroughly and without prejudice as an important document of the United Nations. It is one of the many contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security made by Ecuadorian citizens and by our country itself in its international life as a founding Member of the United Nations.

12. Mr. KHALIL (Egypt) [*interpretation from Arabic*]: This is the first time the Egyptian delegation is participating in the work of the Council under your presidency, Sir. It is pleased to do so, especially since your well-known tact, outstanding competence and diplomatic experience will guarantee the good conduct of the business of the Council in the month of May. Allow me to express sincere appreciation to Mr. Vladimir Kravets, the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, on the exemplary manner in which he conducted the work of the Council last month.

13. At the outset I should like to affirm the great importance Egypt attaches to the achievement of a permanent, just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. Egypt has an interest in stability in Cyprus for several reasons, including the fact that both States are among the founding members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and Cyprus is a Mediterranean country for which Egypt desires the preservation of peace and security, just as it desires it for the whole region. These joint concerns were reflected in the recent visit to Cairo by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus.

14. Egypt has always been convinced that the basis of such a settlement cannot be other than full respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and non-alignment of Cyprus. This position stems from the principles of the Charter, the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of Cyprus, and the decisions of the Non-Aligned Movement.

15. In the light of those facts, last November Egypt defined before the Council [*2500th meeting*] its clear position on the declaration of the establishment of a separate republic in northern Cyprus, which declaration constituted a grave development in the situation. For the same reasons, today we express our grave concern at the recent developments, especially declarations and actions that are completely at variance with due compliance with Security Council resolution 541 (1983). Those steps diminish the prospects for

achieving a permanent, just and peaceful solution to the question of Cyprus, which we feel must guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for the two communities, Greek and Turkish, and must represent a firm basis for coexistence within a single Cyprus. At the same time, Egypt has supported, and still supports, the view that dialogue and negotiation between the two Cypriot communities is the only approach that will lead to the achievement of that objective, although we do not underestimate the difficulties obstructing that approach.

16. The delegation of Egypt has studied with great attention the Secretary-General's report in document S/16519, especially the account therein of the persistent efforts to implement United Nations resolutions. The developments and facts outlined in that report speak for themselves, as stated by the Secretary-General; they also identify the reasons for the frustration of the constructive efforts and sincere endeavours of the Secretary-General and his assistants. Here, we cannot fail to express our great sorrow at the threat posed to the negotiation process itself.

17. Our delegation has listened attentively to the statements made in the Council so far. We shall continue to follow the debate in the hope of finding the best way for the Council to assist the Secretary-General to continue his good offices mission.

18. The statements made by the parties directly concerned should undoubtedly give everyone pause for reflection, rather than our merely recording our positions or rushing into something that would diminish the prospects for negotiations at this critical stage of the question of Cyprus. In our view, thought must be given to finding the best means of re-establishing a favourable atmosphere to support the Secretary-General's mission and to pave the way for the resumption of negotiations between the Turkish and Greek communities as partners having the same destiny, to enable them to live in harmony and coexist in a single, undivided country.

19. Hence my delegation is ready to co-operate with you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council in any such endeavour at this very sensitive time that we all agree is fraught with difficulties. At the same time we concur with the Secretary-General's statement in his report to the effect that the current situation requires the maintenance of continued dialogue and negotiation.

20. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The next speaker is the representative of Australia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

21. Mr. WOOLCOTT (Australia): May I thank you, Mr. President, and, through you, the other members of the Council for agreeing to my request to address the Council today. May I also congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. Your skills, long experience and dedication are well known to us all.

22. It is a matter of serious concern to the Australian Government that recent developments in Cyprus have made it necessary for the Security Council once again to consider the situation in that troubled island. The statements to the Council yesterday [*2531st meeting*] of President Kyprianou of the Republic of Cyprus and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Denktaş, emphasized the extent to which the situation in Cyprus has drifted further into what we can describe only as an increasingly dangerous and divisive deadlock.

23. Our participation in this debate today reflects our concern about those developments. Australia's interest in and concern for the situation in Cyprus is also demonstrated by our participation in the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in the Commonwealth Action Group on Cyprus, established at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at New Delhi last November.

24. When the Security Council adopted resolution 541 (1983) last November, the Australian Government was hopeful that that resolution might pave the way for a reduction of tension on the island. Regrettably, that has not been the case; instead, new developments have taken place which have led to a further deterioration of the situation. We deeply regret the recent exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which we see as undesirable and unhelpful, particularly in terms of its timing, and we have made this clear in representations to the Turkish Government.

25. The Secretary-General is to be commended once again for presenting the Security Council with a forthright report on recent developments. His latest report [*S/16519*], however, is a sombre document and it makes depressing reading. As he says in paragraph 23, "The developments outlined in this report speak for themselves."

26. Australia has consistently supported the Secretary-General in his efforts towards a resolution of the Cyprus question, and we shall continue to do so. The ideas that the Secretary-General has outlined in his report, in our view, merit far more serious attention than has so far been given to them. His mandate still has the potential to reduce tensions on the island. His readiness to provide his good offices is indispensable and deserves the unambiguous and unanimous support of the Security Council and of the parties principal. In this regard, let me say frankly that the Australian Government considers it would be helpful if the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Denktaş, were to look again, and in a co-operative spirit, at his exchanges with the Secretary-General.

27. In his report the Secretary-General describes the continued deployment of UNFICYP as essential. The

Australian Government calls upon the parties principal to the conflict to do nothing which would hinder the peace-keeping and humanitarian role which the United Nations Force in Cyprus carries out with distinction in both sectors of the island.

28. The history of Cyprus has been bedevilled by intransigence and lack of trust on both sides. We have seen this manifested already in the current debate. The Australian Government believes that, despite recent setbacks, the best hope for progress towards a settlement in Cyprus lies in renewed discussions and contacts, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities which would take into account the legitimate concerns of both. Moderation from all parties is an essential requirement at this difficult and delicate stage, if there is to be progress towards a solution in Cyprus.

29. The Security Council has a clear responsibility in the current situation. We ask the Council to make clear to the parties the essential need for co-operation, communication and genuine negotiation, and we call on the parties themselves to heed such a call. Only then will peace and stability return to the island of Cyprus, which for too long has known too little of both.

30. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The next speaker is the representative of Yugoslavia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

31. Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia): First of all, Sir, I should like to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. As the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, you are well known at the United Nations for your wisdom and knowledge and for the high esteem in which we your colleagues hold you. We are gratified that so eminently qualified a person should be occupying the presidency of the Council for this month. I wish also to express our great admiration for the way in which Mr. Kravets of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic presided over the Council in the month of April.

32. At the core of the situation in Cyprus currently being considered by the Security Council is the unity, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, a Member of the United Nations and a founding member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Moreover, this situation is a component part of the sensitive region of the eastern Mediterranean and of the uncertainties, challenges to peace and threats to international security prevailing there.

33. It may be recalled here that, immediately after the unilateral proclamation of independence in November last year, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia issued a statement to the effect, *inter alia*, that it had considered the latest situation created by the unilateral proclamation of independence of the part of Cyprus occupied by Turkish armed forces in 1974 and that that unilateral proclamation was a direct violation of the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and hindered the efforts of the Secretary-General to seek a peaceful solution to the problem of Cyprus through talks between the two Cypriot communities.

34. The Presidency considered it indispensable that new efforts be undertaken immediately with a view to starting negotiations between the two Cypriot communities on an equal footing, in order to achieve a solution acceptable to both parties, with full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus and based on the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and on the principles of non-alignment.

35. It may also be recalled that the heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries at their Seventh Conference, held at New Delhi in March last year, reiterated full solidarity with and support for the people and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and also reaffirmed respect for that country's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment. They expressed deep concern over the fact that part of the Republic of Cyprus continued under foreign occupation, and they demanded the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces as an essential basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem. At that time they pointed out that the *de facto* situation created by force of arms and unilateral actions should not in any way affect the solution of the problem.

36. In its resolution 541 (1983) of November last year the Security Council, *inter alia*, considered the unilateral declaration of independence invalid and called for its withdrawal. It requested the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus and called upon the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General. It also called upon all States and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation. That call of the Security Council was supported by the international community at large. It was strongly hoped at that time that it would bring about restraint and the reversal and withdrawal of the unilateral proclamation of independence purporting to create an independent State of Northern Cyprus. It was also hoped that the efforts of the Secretary-General would pave the way to dialogue and a negotiated settlement.

37. The Members of the United Nations withheld recognition of the new self-proclaimed entity. However, the Security Council's call was not heeded by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community, and they have taken measures in direct contravention of resolution 541 (1983) and the efforts of the Secretary-General. Thus another link has been added to the long chain of *faits accomplis*.

38. Once again the policy of *fait accompli* has delivered a heavy blow to efforts to resolve the problem through negotiations based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. One *fait accompli* is being used as justification for another, and thus the crisis is developing in a vicious downward spiral of events. It would be dangerous for us to get accustomed to long-lasting violations of sovereign rights of a State —in this case the Republic of Cyprus—and to allow one *fait accompli* to follow another.

39. An end must be put to this downward spiral that is threatening to result in the partition of Cyprus and its eventual disappearance as a unified island entity. These and other important aspects of the crisis were most ably and effectively put forward yesterday by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou.

40. Intercommunal talks and dialogue are the way to peace and stability in Cyprus, and all parties should shy away from actions that make dialogue more and more irrelevant and bring the partition of the Republic of Cyprus closer and closer. The unilateral proclamation and the ensuing measures in no way promote these negotiations. We cannot but conclude that all these measures undertaken by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community are attempts to consolidate the grounds for the dismemberment of the Republic of Cyprus and to render the basis for dialogue non-existent. We feel it is indispensable to call again for the withdrawal of the unilateral proclamation and the ensuing measures and to make them null and void.

41. There are no questions we know of that cannot be resolved through dialogue, and surely none can be resolved in the long run by force, going against the General Assembly and the Security Council in particular, and against the standards of the international community.

42. It may be appropriate to stress again, at this stage, that the solution to the problem of Cyprus can be based only on the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Republic of Cyprus and on cessation of occupation and of foreign interference. The presence of foreign troops threatens to spread the conflict by creating opportunities for the involvement of other factors. No amount of foreign troops will help, and an increase in foreign military presence will jeopardize even more the peace and security of the region.

43. Further active engagement of the Secretary-General is invaluable. His readiness to discharge the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council is extremely welcome. His most recent report on the situation testifies to the fact that he is taking into account the interests of the two Cypriot communities, on the basis of his extensive knowledge of the situation and the possibilities for a political solution of the problem. His services and initiatives are indispensable in this new situation, particularly since maintenance of a continuous process of communication and negotiations between the parties to the dispute is indispensable in the search for a solution.

44. However, the efforts of the Secretary-General can have meaningful effect only if they have the undivided and unambiguous support of all and if all parties involved show political will and co-operation. This thus implies the need for the most urgent cessation of all acts leading to the partition of the Republic of Cyprus and an end to the occupation of a part of the country. This also implies the cessation of all acts contrary to Council resolution 541 (1983), which calls for the withdrawal of the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities that purports to create an independent State in Northern Cyprus.

45. We consider of particular importance urgent action by the Security Council, aimed at providing a peaceful solution on the basis of the adopted resolutions, in order to prevent any further deterioration, to re-establish the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus by peaceful means and to lend its full support to the sovereignty, independence and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

46. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic containing a request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representative of that country to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al-Atassi (Syrian Arab Republic), took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

47. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I now call on Mr. Al-Atassi to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

48. Mr. AL-ATASSI (Syrian Arab Republic) [*interpretation from Arabic*]: At the outset, Sir, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are convinced that your experience, ability and skill will lead to success in your conduct of the Council's work. You represent a friendly country, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which has always supported peoples threatened by aggression or struggling for independence and freedom. We should also like to voice our admiration for the exemplary way in which your predecessor, Mr. Kravets, the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, conducted the work of the Council last month.

49. Our delegation, having studied with interest the report of the Secretary-General, published as docu-

ment S/16519, dated 1 May 1984, commends the efforts he has been making to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions and believes that the proposals calling for high-level dialogue are a constructive initiative to implement the Council's resolutions.

50. The Syrian Arab Republic has high hopes that it will be possible to achieve a just and comprehensive solution to the problem of Cyprus based primarily on the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence of the island and its non-aligned status, and also on the basis of respect for and implementation of Security Council resolutions. In that connection, as the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Hafez al Assad, stated at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983, during the consideration of major international questions:

> "This neighbouring country, Cyprus, is suffering from partition, which has caused great suffering to the people of that country. We favour a peaceful solution, which would unite it and enable its people to recover its national unity and total independence and to coexist and co-operate with its neighbours and maintain its non-aligned status. We also favour negotiations between representatives of the two Cypriot communities under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in keeping with United Nations resolutions."

51. The fact that Cyprus is a friendly neighbouring non-aligned country explains Syria's interest in the situation in that island. Furthermore, this concern emanates from Syria's obligations *vis-à-vis* the Charter of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the Non-Aligned Movement.

52. The concern shown by our country over the prolongation of this problem is a sincere and sound reflection of this position. The security situation in the Mediterranean is precarious and threatens to explode at any time. Needless to say, Israel—and behind it the United States of America—is imperilling the security of the region. This danger of explosion is compounded by the strategic co-operation between the United States and its favourite ally, Israel. Recently the United States Navy and other navies were in the eastern Mediterranean and, not content with making a show of force, even bombed the civilian population of the region.

53. Finally, my delegation would like to express its concern over the fact that it has not been possible thus far to resolve the problem of Cyprus in accordance with United Nations resolutions. We believe that the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions adopted since 1974 are a unanimously accepted basis for achieving a solution to the problem of Cyprus. I think in particular of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which contains, *inter alia*, the intercommunal negotiating principle in the context of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and of non-intervention in its internal affairs.

54. My delegation reaffirms that we must continue to make greater international efforts. We very much hope that the Council will achieve a just solution to the problem of Cyprus and urge the two Cypriot communities to resume intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on the constructive basis accepted by both parties. These negotiations should take place on a basis of equality, in the context of freedom and the comprehensive proposals made by both sides to achieve an agreement guaranteeing their basic, legitimate rights. These negotiations should also take place with respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-aligned status of Cyprus, as well as being in keeping with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

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UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-NINTH YEAR

2534th MEETING: 4 MAY 1984

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2534th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 4 May 1984, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Oleg A. TROYANOVSKY
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2534)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:
   Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

The meeting was called to order at 4.20 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 30 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16514)

1. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: In accordance with the decisions taken at the previous meetings on this item [*2531st to 2533rd meetings*] I invite the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to take places at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Iacovou (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Jacobs (Antigua and Barbuda), Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Mr. Albornoz (Ecuador), Mr. Wijewardane (Sri Lanka), Mr. Al-Atassi (Syrian Arab Republic) and Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Algeria in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: The Security Council will now resume its consideration of the item on its agenda. The first speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. WIJEWARDANE (Sri Lanka): I wish to thank you, Sir, and the other members of the Council for affording my delegation an opportunity to address the Council on the situation in Cyprus. I also wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of May. We are confident that, with your mature judgement, experience and well-known diplomatic skill, you will be able to guide the Council to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion of this debate. May I also take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Mr. Kravets of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for the able manner in which he conducted the Council's work during the month of April.

5. The situation in Cyprus has engaged the attention of the United Nations for two decades. During the past 20 years this issue has been brought before the Council, as well as the General Assembly, on numerous occasions. The deteriorating situation in that country necessitated the reconvening of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly in May of last year, and within six months the Security Council had to be convened as a result of the decision taken by the Turkish Cypriot side to declare unilateral independence.

6. Security Council resolution 186 (1964), adopted in March 1964, dealt with the problem of the situation in Cyprus. The third preambular paragraph of that resolution made reference to the cardinal principles enshrined in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. Since then the Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted resolutions on the subject, including Council resolution 365 (1974) and Assembly resolution

3212 (XXIX). In paragraph 1 of the latter the Assembly "Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it", and in paragraph 2 it "Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs". Regrettably, these resolutions remain unimplemented to date, except in so far as they led to the revival of intercommunal dialogue.

7. In 1974, when Cyprus was invaded and occupied, the international community believed that what happened in Cyprus was an aberration in international relations and only a temporary phenomenon. However, throughout the ensuing decade this belief has continued even when certain ominous developments took place in Cyprus, such as the unilateral announcement of February 1975 which declared that the occupied part of Cyprus would become "the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus".

8. As we are aware, the Security Council and the General Assembly have recommended the continuation of intercommunal talks and have entrusted the Secretary-General with the responsibility of pursuing his mission of good offices. However, the international community, to its dismay, finds the situation in Cyprus continuing to deteriorate. Regrettably, while the Secretary-General was making every attempt to fulfil his mandate, the Turkish Cypriot side, on the other hand, was continuing its strategy of working against the resolutions of the Security Council.

9. Having declared unilateral independence in November last year, which was declared legally invalid by the Security Council, the Turkish Cypriot side has taken other steps, such as announcing its intention to adopt a flag of its own in March this year and holding a "constitutional referendum" and "elections" in August and November 1984, respectively, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report [*S/16519*]. The situation has been further aggravated by the decision to exchange ambassadors. We have to bear in mind that all these activities were set in motion by the Turkish Cypriot side at a time when the Secretary-General was conducting an active dialogue with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot side.

10. As a member of the Commonwealth, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the contact group on Cyprus, Sri Lanka has closely followed the events in Cyprus. Sri Lanka views the recent developments that have taken place in Cyprus with deep concern and regret. We have consistently supported the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and have called for both the withdrawal of foreign troops and non-interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus.

11. No sooner had the Government of Sri Lanka learned of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot side than the Minister for Foreign Affairs issued a statement, which the Sri Lanka delegation quoted in the Council on 18 November 1983. In that statement the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka said that the "illegal and unilateral declaration of independence ... is a regrettable setback to the efforts being made to achieve a peaceful, unified and stable Cyprus through the efforts of the Government of Cyprus, the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement" [*see 2499th meeting, para. 27*]. He further stated that Sri Lanka would not extend any form of recognition to that entity.

12. Cyprus has come before the Security Council once again because it is the principal organ of the United Nations which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council should not be complacent merely because there is no violence or bloodshed in Cyprus at present. It has to take into consideration the fact that the armed intervention against Cyprus took place 10 years ago and that the occupation of that country has continued since then.

13. In his report of 1 May, the Secretary-General has emphasized the importance of maintaining a continuing process of communication and negotiation and uninterrupted deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The delegation of Sri Lanka wholeheartedly supports this position. It is my delegation's fervent hope that the Security Council, having taken into consideration the report of the Secretary-General and the statements made before the Council, will decide on appropriate measures that would arrest the deteriorating situation in Cyprus. It is also our hope that the Council will give a fresh mandate to the Secretary-General to intensify his mission of good offices and call on all parties concerned to give their wholehearted co-operation to him, which is essential to finding a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus.

14. In addition to any their decisions the Council may wish to make, it should also examine the most effective ways of implementing its previous resolutions on the subject, preferably within a given time-frame.

15. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Russian*]: Mr. Rauf Denktaş, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure at the 2531st meeting, wishes to make a further statement. With the consent of the Council, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

16. Mr. DENKTAŞ: I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me a second opportunity to speak before the Council in order to make a further statement in reply to what we have heard about the Cyprus problem, yesterday and today, from various speakers.

17. The representative of Sri Lanka has just spoken in very eloquent terms, and this morning [*2533rd meeting*]

the representative of Yugoslavia spoke in equally eloquent terms. In this connection all I want to mention is this. These two countries are members of the contact group. The contact group has been one-sided and what they said was one-sided. With all the good intentions in this world, if our point of view is not understood, if we are not treated as part of Cyprus, as people some of whom have died in order to protect the independence of Cyprus from being destroyed in the name of *enosis*, as people who for 20 years have been treated in a manner which no other people would have accepted, then, of course, the situation will not be improved.

18. Intercommunal talks are, as named, "intercommunal" talks. The concept of a legitimate Government within the intercommunal talks or over the intercommunal talks cannot be supported, having regard to the facts of Cyprus. And it is because this concept has been bolstered by people and countries that know little about Cyprus and that have been misinformed for many years that progress is not being made. I beg that the Secretary-General's hands be untied, so that he may be free from this concept in conducting his good-offices mission. Otherwise, in making offers with this concept of "the Government of Cyprus" as his starting-point, he is hindered from doing justice to the two sides.

19. I shall now refer to the allegations made by the Greek Cypriot side yesterday [*2531st and 2532nd meetings*]. I shall begin by again pointing out that the Greek Cypriots who occupy the seat of Cyprus do not have the mandate of the whole of Cyprus. They are usurpers of power, usurpers of the name of the Government of Cyprus. They have no mandate under the Constitution because, were the Constitution still valid—and it is not, since they have consigned it to the waste-paper basket long ago—the Turkish Cypriot side would have to countersign their credentials and appointments to their posts, and there would also have to be Turkish Cypriot representatives with them. Since they have wiped out all Turkish Cypriot personnel from the organs of the State, they have no Turkish Cypriot representative there. It is a 100 per cent Greek Cypriot racist régime that is being presented to the Council and to the world as the Government of Cyprus.

20. That is the first point I wished to make, and I shall make it repeatedly because this is the law and this is a fact in Cyprus; and unless we pay due regard to the laws and to the facts of the case, we shall not be able to find justice. Justice cannot be sought in the abstract and without a fair statement of facts and the law pertaining to them.

21. What are the facts of Cyprus? I stated them yesterday [*2531st meeting*]. The Republic of Cyprus—its independence and sovereignty—was not won by the Greek Cypriots. It was won by the two peoples of Cyprus as a result of a conflict—the conflict of union with Greece, which Greek Cypriots regarded as liberty—and our resistance to it because we regarded it as neocolonialism.

22. In order to prevent a Greco-Turkish war and to put an end to a civil war in Cyprus, a *sui generis* state of partnership was established. It is this partnership which was destroyed in 1963, and the whole exercise since then has been to re-establish this partnership, for which there is a formula.

23. In 1977, I agreed with Makarios to settle this problem by establishing the partnership in a bi-zonal federal republic. So if we have not gone there it is not because, as the Greek Cypriot side now proclaims, that Turkey, as an aggressor, has invaded Cyprus. Who has invaded Cyprus? I would like to remind the Council by citing Archbishop Makarios himself, who on 19 July 1974, talking to the Security Council, said:

> "The *coup* . . . is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The so-called *coup* was the work of the Greek officers staffing and commanding the National Guard." [*See 1780th meeting, para. 18.*]

24. The 15 July 1974 *coup* was an invasion and the invasion continues so long as there are Greek officers in Cyprus. This invasion could not be stopped by any country except Turkey, as a guaranteeing Power. Greek officers are still in Cyprus, their numbers are increasing, and there is the threat that they will increase even more. Yesterday I quoted Prime Minister Papandreou's statement that he regards Cyprus as a Greek State and that he aims at uniting the two Greeces and making them into one.

25. That is the position, and I ask whether representatives who have been accusing us of fomenting a secessionist movement and of defying the Security Council are aware that, if we had not resisted what Greek Cypriots were doing in Cyprus, we would have been dead, or we would have been completely out of our own State. We have saved our State. We have saved our partnership rights and we are entitled to sit with our Greek Cypriot partner and re-establish the partnership, if that is what they wish to do.

26. It was stated yesterday by the Greek Cypriot representative that Turkey is the alien and undesirable element in Cyprus, that Turkey has come and partitioned the island. You will recollect that the green line was drawn in 1963 when Greek Cypriots attacked us with their secret armies in order to down us as a partner community and in order to unite the island with Greece. The green-line division started then. The green line is where we stopped the Greek Cypriot aggressor. The green line is where the two communities, the two partners, fell apart because of the Greek Cypriot attack. To say that Turkey came and partitioned the island is misinformation and does not impute good will to us.

27. On this point let me refer to the Greek representative's statement in July 1974, when he said:

> "Contemptuously disregarding the written warnings by former Foreign Minister Averoff, he"—Maka-

rios—"insisted on proposing the 13 points for the amendment of the Zurich Constitution, thus opening Aeolus' bags, which resulted in the tragic clashes of December 1963 and the *de facto* partition of the island by the so-called green line." [*ibid., para. 46.*]

So this Greek Cypriot's presentation that Turkey came, invaded and divided the country is false information. Turkey came and prevented the utter invasion of Cyprus by Greek forces. Then we have all the records of the Secretary-General which show how the Greek army came into Cyprus first clandestinely and then openly.

28. I should like to refer the Council to Papandreou's book where he boasts about his father in the following words:

"On June 14"—this is 1964—"he sent Grivas, by then a Lieutenant General in the Greek army, to Cyprus, for the purpose of co-ordinating future military actions against the Turkish Cypriots. He also made good on his promise to smuggle in troops from mainland Greece. He entrusted Defence Minister Peter Garufalias with the responsibility of directing this operation. According to the noted journalist, Takis Torikopalos, Garufalias managed to pull off a magnificent *coup* under cover of darkness. Using only small yachts and fishing boats, 9,000 men and 950 officers, fully equipped and heavily armed, landed in Cyprus."

These troops became the backbone of the new National Guard, the unconstitutionally created Cypriot army. Why? In order to pursue military actions against the Turkish Cypriots and to unite Cyprus with Greece.

29. And this is what *Newsweek* reports:

"Before dawn each day the great iron doors of the Port of Limassol are slammed shut. Turkish Cypriot dockers are sent home. United Nations guards are barred. A few hours later the doors swing open and covered lorries, weaving on heavily overloaded springs, roar out of the Port and head northwards towards the Troodos Mountains".

30. I put the following question to any representative who invites us to submit to the kind of organization represented by the Government of Cyprus: if three fourths of the population of your country accepted all these troops from another State with the intention of destroying your country; if they clandestinely defied United Nations Forces and prepared for action against one fourth of the population, and you were the one fourth; if they destroyed the constitutional setup and threw the whole Constitution and rule of law into the waste-paper basket, would you have accepted them as we are supposed to accept the Government of Cyprus?

31. How can representatives expect us to accept a situation to which they themselves would never bow as men of honour, as men who love their countries and as men who love freedom? That is what we refuse to do, that is why the Cyprus problem has proceeded so far and that is what they are still doing to Cyprus.

32. We want the Government of Cyprus to be established as a binational government. We have made proposals, and we are waiting for the Greek Cypriots to come to the table and start the negotiations from the point where we left off. There is no other way and there is no other solution except the establishment of a federal republic of Cyprus, if Cyprus is going to be united.

33. When I last addressed the Council I said that if the unity of Cyprus was really desired its duality must be accepted—otherwise, there is no need for unity; unity exists. If the Government of Cyprus exists as a legitimate organ, there is no reason for the intercommunal talks at all, because the purpose of those talks is to establish a legitimate, bicommunal, binational, bi-zonal Government. So how can the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Non-Aligned Movement blow hot and cold at the same time, asserting that the legitimate Government has to be obeyed and that what it says is the order of the day, and tying the Secretary-General's hands so that he cannot move away from this concept, which blocks the way to peace, to a final settlement? This is my question to you all.

34. It becomes clearer to me with every meeting that the more votes they receive on their resolutions —which have nothing to do with the realities of Cyprus, and therefore we are forced not to accept those resolutions, because they are one-sided and based on the wrong concept—the surer they become of themselves, and we hear statements such as the one we heard yesterday that they are the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus and that is why they are in the Security Council. A 100 per cent Greek Cypriot administration, representing only the Greek Cypriots, not having dealt with the Turkish Cypriots for 21 years, except by attacking them and depriving them of their rights, says that it is the legitimate Government of Cyprus. According to the Security Council's resolutions, Cyprus is a binational State, and intercommunal talks are required, urged and advised in order to settle the problem.

35. How can this be? It becomes possible with the one-sided resolutions and with this concept of the legitimate Government. I am not asking the Council to reverse its decisions on those points. All that I am asking representatives to do is to whisper into the Secretary-General's ear that they know what kind of a legitimate Government the Greek Cypriots are at this stage, and know that at the negotiating table it is not necessary to ask the Turkish side to accept anything emanating from the so-called legitimate Government, as the Greek side does not have to accept anything emanating from the Northern Republic of Cyprus. It is the two peoples, the co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus, the people who created the Republic of Cyprus as partners, talking in order to make a partnership State again possible.

36. I say to the Council: "If this is the end you all want, I am sure you will be careful in your resolution. You will not hit us and pat the Greek Cypriot side on the back, because by doing so for so many years you have unwittingly prevented a solution." It is not realistic that we should be asked to be obedient and pay allegiance to an organization to which we owe no allegiance, an organization 100 per cent Greek Cypriot, an organization which has done nothing but harm to us for 21 years.

37. Yesterday I read out to the Council passages from a report of the Secretary-General, to the effect that as a result of the 1963 onslaught on us, all our Turkish Cypriot personnel had been ejected from the bicommunal Republic of Cyprus. I shall read out again from the report of the Secretary-General of 10 September 1964, as follows:

> "The UNFICYP authorities, from the beginning of their mandate in Cyprus, gave serious consideration to this question and on several occasions raised it with the Cyprus Government. All negotiations on the possible re-employment of the Turkish Cypriot civil servants in Nicosia and their financial compensation from January 1964 have so far ended in a deadlock, as the matter is considered by the Government to be highly political and closely linked with the final settlement of the Cyprus question." [*See S/5950, para. 108.*]

That political question has not been settled so far, and for 21 years all Turkish civil servants have been unable to work at their posts, so they have worked for the Turkish Cypriot community in order not to let them down, in order not to leave them in a vacuum. But the Council was told seriously yesterday: "We never expelled anyone from the Government service. Turkish ministers were threatened out of office by Turkey." Can the Council accept so much for so long? Can it be misled so openly on important matters where the life and liberty of a people are at stake? Can it act on such misinformation, and can representatives then go home and rest and sleep with their consciences clear that they have done justice to Cyprus?

38. What is the political matter which has to be settled? I refer to the Secretary-General's report of 29 July 1965 [*S/6569*]. Turkish Cypriot members of the Cyprus Parliament have been kicked out. They cannot go because of the situation, but they must go. We see that Greek Cypriots are making headway. We see that they are pleased with the fact that they have kicked us out, so we make representations to go, and I quote paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Secretary-General's report:

> "The Turkish Cypriot members requested UNFICYP to extend its good offices to enable them to receive information about the time of meeting of the House, and to make arrangements for the Turkish Cypriot members to attend such meetings in safety. ...
>
> "The Special Representative conveyed this position to Mr. Glafkos Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives, who stated that the Turkish Cypriot members could attend provided agreement were reached beforehand on the following points:
>
> "*(a)* The Turkish Cypriot members would resume their seats permanently rather than only for the purpose of the present debate;
>
> "*(b)* The Turkish Cypriot members would accept that the laws enacted by the House of Representatives would be applied to the whole of Cyprus"—

laws enacted while Turkish members are out—and the House cannot act legitimately on a great deal of legislation without the Turkish members voting for or against—but we must accept as proper all legislation that they pass. Paragraph 8 continues:

> "*(c)* While the Greek Cypriot members would regard attendance at the House by the Turkish Cypriot members as implying recognition by them of the ... Cyprus Government"—it has no Turk in it, but that must imply recognition of the Cyprus Government—"the Turkish Cypriot members would not be called upon to make a statement to that effect."

Secretly we would agree that we accepted them as the Cyprus Government. They know they are not, so they are putting this condition to us at gunpoint, that we must accept them—a 100 per cent Greek Cypriot racist régime—as the Cyprus Government, and it is that organization that the Security Council and the General Assembly have continued to treat as the legitimate Government of Cyprus. Paragraph 8 continues:

> "*(d)* It must be understood that the provision in article 78 of the Constitution concerning separate majorities had been abolished and every member of the House would have one vote for all decisions."

The Constitution had been abolished—by whom? By the Greek Cypriots. And we had to accept it.

39. The report goes on, in paragraph 9:

> "Mr. Clerides informed UNFICYP that he was prepared to discuss the situation during the afternoon of 22 July with a group of Turkish Cypriot members of the House. He subsequently indicated, however, that he would not receive this delegation if they came escorted by UNFICYP soldiers"—people are afraid to go to the Greek side, but they must not be escorted—"though he would not object to their being brought to his office in an UNFICYP automobile driven by an UNFICYP employee."

40. This, I hope, gives members of the Council a picture of Cyprus, of the condition my community was in: we were without the protection of the Constitution,

without the protection of law, without a legitimate Government—only people who had assumed the role of the Government of Cyprus and who were threatening us, that we must submit to them or else. The report continues, in paragraph 9:

"Finally, Mr. Clerides stated that unless the Turkish Cypriot members accepted the conditions laid down by him, he found it pointless to supply to them copies of the pending bills."

41. The report then notes that this was passed on to the Turkish side and that the Turkish Cypriots did not accept it. They pointed out that it was contrary to the Constitution. In paragraph 11 the report goes on:

"During the afternoon, the Turkish Cypriot members visited the President of the House, who reiterated the substance of the points set forth in paragraph 8 above. He made it plain that, unless agreement was reached on these matters, he would not permit the Turkish Cypriot members to attend the House. Mr. Clerides also stated that the constitutional provisions concerning promulgation of the laws by the President and the Vice-President [conjointly] were no longer applicable. He subsequently stated that in his opinion the Turkish Cypriot members had no legal standing any more in the House."

42. We have been urged by the representative of India and others to submit to this Government. Would they submit to such an institution as the legal Government of a State? Would they bow to such indignity? Would their leader, the fighter, the renowned Gandhi, have advised them to submit to that indignity? That is the question.

43. This was the state of affairs. This is what people accepted as the Government of Cyprus and those who sit at the other end of this table are the remnants of that Government.

44. We did not bow to them, and we feel very proud of the fact that we did not. We lived in caves; we went hungry; Red Crescent food was denied us. But we did not bow to them. Turkey was not there invading the country; Greece was there with 20,000 troops, as I read out from Papandreou's book. We did not bow to them, and we expected the Security Council to say to us, "Well done; you are upholding the validity of international treaties; you are upholding the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus; you are upholding human dignity with this fight." But there was no one to tell the Council the truth. The few people who were in the embassies of Cyprus were kicked out, so the Council heard only the Greek Cypriots.

45. If non-aligned principles recognize such Governments as Governments fully entitled to rule other people by oppressing them and by denying them justice, then we must take a second look at those non-aligned principles. I do not think, though, that those principles provide for the oppression of a people by usurpers of power, for the rule of one set of people without their consent by another set of people, or for clandestine importation of troops from another country in order to destroy the sovereignty and independence of a State and unite it with Greece.

46. We have been shouting these things; why do the non-aligned peoples not hear us? What is wrong with us that we cannot make ourselves understood? We are fighting for our country, for our independence and for our sovereignty, which for 21 years have been grabbed from us. Every action we take is taken in order to establish that we exist, to prove to the world, and to them, that we shall never submit.

47. And they come and say to the Security Council that they never threw anyone out. Were Turkish Ministers threatened out of office by Turkey? And they say that there are "at least a few courageous Turkish Cypriots who defied Turkey and are still working with us". I think of the prestige of the Council when such lies can be uttered. Only 134 Turkish Cypriots live in the south. We have exchanged populations; populations have moved because of the war and since the war; UNFICYP has carried them. Two zones have been established. Most of the 134 Turkish Cypriots who live in the south are old people attached to their homes. And the Council is told that "some courageous Turks have defied Turkey and are working with us" and that 150,000 cowardly Turks have obeyed Turkey and are not working with them.

48. Is the Council going to accept that presentation of the Cyprus facts? Is it going to condemn us on that presentation? Is it not going to look into the facts coolly? Is it not going to ask the Secretary-General to report on the realities of Cyprus as a beginning for his mission of good offices? Is it going to have him bogged down with the resolutions adopted on the basis of such misinformation? Those are my questions to the Council. Its resolution will either finish the intercommunal talks completely and leave Cyprus divided, or will—if there is to be a reasonable, good and balanced resolution—help the reactivation of the talks. We want reactivation of the talks.

49. We are told that the representative of the "Cyprus Government" never regarded Turkish Cypriots as second-class citizens. How true: we were regarded as fifth-, sixth-, or seventh-class citizens. We were regarded as rebels in our own country for having defied them, for having defied their armed activity and their conspiracy with Greece to annex Cyprus. We were regarded as rebels to be shot on sight, and we were shot on sight. We lost 103 villages. And he says to the Council that they never regarded us as second-class citizens. Just think what they would have done to us if they had so regarded us.

50. Let us have a very short look at how they treated the Turkish Cypriots whom they did not regard as second-class citizens, and ask yourselves, gentlemen

—and you, Sir, the representative of the land of Gandhi and a distinguished representative, ask yourself—if a so-called Government which had taken over control of all the organs of the State by force of arms and was trying to destroy you, treating you in the way you shall hear when I read it out to you, whether you would have then submitted to it, or whether you would have fought for your liberty and for your vested rights in the body politic of your land.

51. I shall read out from the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 1967:

> "thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled from their homes, taking with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in what they considered to be safer Turkish Cypriot villages and areas." [*See S/8286, para. 126.*]

From what were they fleeing? Were they fleeing from the legitimate Government of Cyprus or from those who had usurped the title, who had planned secret armies under different leaders, who had taken an oath to unite Cyprus with Greece and who had attacked us because the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Kyprianou, had reported to Makarios that the non-aligned were now ready by their votes to abrogate the 1960 treaties, and Turkey would never be allowed to intervene under those treaties?

52. From the report of the Secretary-General dated 10 September 1964 [*S/5950*]—and I shall summarize, from paragraph 190:

> "In addition to losses incurred in agriculture and in industry during the first part of the year, the Turkish community had lost other sources of its income, including the salaries of over 4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government and by public and private concerns located in the Greek Cypriot zones."

But we are told Turkey divided the country. No—their attack divided the country into Greek and Turkish zones. The paragraph continues:

> "The trade of the Turkish community had declined considerably ... owing to the existing situation, and unemployment had reached a very high level, as approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots had become refugees. Expenditure of the Turkish Communal Chamber on development and other projects, as well as other expenditure, had dropped considerably as a yearly subsidy formerly received from the Government had ceased to be granted in 1964."

The subsidy was for the education of our elementary schoolchildren; that also had been stopped, and our children had to go to school in barns, in garages and places like that. The paragraph goes on:

> "In accordance with figures published by the Turkish Communal Chamber, the number of persons receiving some kind of assistance from the Red Crescent relief amounted to about 56,000."

Nearly half of the population was living on Red Crescent relief for years.

53. Would the members of this Council ask us to accept those who treated us like this as the legitimate Government of Cyprus? If you do, then the Charter is not working. If you do, then the principles of non-alignment are not there. It is the right of man to be ruled with his consent, with his participation in the Government, not to be kicked around by gunmen who assume the role of the Government of Cyprus.

54. We ask members only to have a look at the facts, to ask the Secretary-General to take a new look at the facts, and not to take as a starting-point this Cyprus Government. Once you have that, you have missed the road and you have mistaken your goal. We all want to proceed towards a united Cyprus in a bi-zonal federal system. If that is also what the Greek Cypriots want, then they should accept this, and Mr. Kyprianou should not raise his nose and say, "I shall never speak to Mr. Denktaş." Why? "Because Mr. Denktaş or his people have established a State." But we had a federated State which was functioning fully as a State, and he talked to me, and it was for the good of Cyprus. What has happened now? Because of his intransigence we had to take a further step. If this intransigence continues, what shall we do, gentlemen? We shall take even further steps, because there is a body politic living in Cyprus. You cannot kill it; you cannot destroy it; you cannot ask my people to live without the protection of a Government, without the protection of a State. They are entitled to it. They are human beings, and the Charter which gives you life provides that they should have this right.

55. From the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 May 1973:

> "Practically no progress has been made during the period under review towards a solution of the problem of the Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. There have been no negotiations on the general question for two years, but from time to time efforts are made to resettle abandoned villages." [*See S/10940, para. 67.*]

56. In the report dated 1 December 1972 we learn that 103 villages have been abandoned and that we want to return to some of them. UNFICYP tries to help; people come and go to the so-called Government of Cyprus; but nothing happens.

> "No progress has been made towards solving the general problem of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. The request for resettlement of the Turkish Cypriot village of Vroisha in Lefka district has been rejected by the Government on the basis that it would be economically unsound for the villagers." [*See S/10842, para. 48.*]

How kind.

57. From the report dated 10 September 1964:

> "Although no cases of starvation have been noted in the Turkish-Cypriot areas, serious inconveniences have been caused to the people subjected to these restrictions and in some cases conditions have reached the hardship stage." [*See S/5950, para. 205.*]

The official list of restricted items had reached 31 items.

58. In September 1965 the Turkish Cypriot leadership drew the attention of UNFICYP to the general question of housing for refugees. The question of supplying the Turkish Cypriots with building materials for improving the accommodation of the refugees was repeatedly taken up by UNFICYP with the highest authorities of the Republic, both as part of the general problem of the maintenance, repair and construction of houses and buildings in Turkish Cypriot areas and as a separate and special problem. Whatever the approach to the problem, the Government did not approve the release of building materials for the refugees. They did no harm to us. We were not second-class citizens. They are the legitimate Government of Cyprus.

59. There are several other quotations, but I shall not waste the Council's time. I shall now deal with other matters which the so-called Cyprus Government thought fit to impose upon us. The quotations are so many, one loses one's self in the deluge of authorities.

60. We were not second-class citizens; they treated us as Cypriots. But we should not mind when they said, "*Enosis* is the aim, and we shall unite the island with Greece at all costs." That is what the President of the country, the man the non-aligned suppose is dying for the preservation of the independence of Cyprus, said on 27 October 1964, while Turkish blood was flowing to protect the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus.

> "Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of its history, and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over, Greek and undivided we shall preserve it, Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece."

Do you now understand, honourable members of the Council, why there exists this anger that we have secured our part and are not going to allow them to unite the island with Greece? That explains the anger.

61. He continues:

> "Greece has become Cyprus, and Cyprus is Greece. I firmly believe that the Pan-Hellenic struggle for the union of Cyprus with fatherland Greece will shortly be crowned with success, and its success will serve as the beginning of a new era of Greek grandeur and glory."

We resisted that, and we are accused of dividing the country. Because we succeeded in defending ourselves, the country was divided. Had we not succeeded, we would all have been dead and forgotten, and Cyprus as an independent non-aligned country would have been dead and forgotten with us. It would have become part of the Greek grandeur and glory, part of Greece, part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

62. They never did any harm to us? This is from UPI, dated 20 August 1974: "Every hour new ditches and numerous corpses are being discovered. It is very difficult to endure the job." My people are discovered in the ditches.

63. From *The Washington Post* of 23 July 1974:

> "In a Greek raid on a small village near Limassol, 36 people out of a population of 200 were killed. The Greeks said they had been given orders to kill the inhabitants of Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived."

We were hostages in their hands. If Turkey moved to save us, we would be killed; if Turkey did not move to save us, we would be destroyed. Is this the approach of peace, of equality, of Cypriotism, of the Government of a land?

64. From *The Washington Post* of 30 July:

> "In Alaminos village, near Larnaca, 14 Turks between the ages of 25 and 55 have been killed and buried in the earth with bulldozers . . . in a Greek raid on a small Turkish village near Limassol, 36 out of 200 killed. Greeks said they had orders to kill the Turks before the Turkish forces arrived."

That confirms the previous quotation.

65. From the Voice of Germany, on 30 July 1974:

> "The human mind cannot comprehend the butchery of the Greeks. In the villages around the Famagusta region the Greek national guards have displayed unsurpassed examples of savagery. Entering Turkish homes, they ruthlessly rained bullets on women and children. They cut the throats of any Turks."

66. From *The Times* of London, 22 July 1974:

> "Thousands of Turks are held as hostages. Turkish women were raped and Turkish children killed on the streets. The Turkish Quarter in Limassol was burned down. The incidents have been confirmed by Greek Cypriots."

Would it add anything if I kept on reading out accounts of such ghastly scenes and of the treatment of my community?

67. And the representative of Cyprus tells the Council, looking me in the face—I had to leave the chamber because I was going to shout, and members would wonder what kind of a man is this—"The Turkish Cypriot community constitutes a precious and inseparable part of the people of our country, and that is how it has been treated."

68. Now we understand. The earth is dug. Greek vases are discovered all over Asia Minor, Cyprus, in the Greek islands. They are very valuable, very precious. That is why they chose to bury us: so that we would become precious findings later. That is all I can say to a man who, knowing history, knowing what has happened in Cyprus for the last 21 years, knowing the plans of the Greek Cypriot leadership, being part of it, the terrorism and the secret armies and the importation of Greek troops to Cyprus, comes and tells the Council that we are a precious and inseparable part of the people of Cyprus. That we are, of course we are. But we were not accepted like that, and we were not treated like that.

69. And then he says, should our community be let free the world would stand witness to one of the most moving scenes of reunion among countrymen with a common destiny and country.

70. Turkey was not in Cyprus before 1974, and what I have read out to the Council is what happened to us before 1974. Turkey was not there. We lost 103 villages because Turkey was not there. We lost 1,500 lives because Turkey was not there. Half of my people became destitute because Turkey was not there. We had 30,000 refugees because Turkey was not there. And we had no law, no order, no justice at all because Turkey was not there. And he says, "Turkey has come and stopped all that beautiful arrangement," and, "If we are left alone again we shall be so pleased you will see joy in the country." Is this information for the Security Council, or is it propaganda for people who know nothing about Cyprus?

71. Then we are told that Turkish Cypriots were not threatened by the *coup*, so we should have done nothing about it. The *coup* was for the union of Cyprus with Greece. Let us see how the Turkish Cypriots were threatened.

72. The Greek cemetery priest Papasetsos, who made a statement to the Greek press on 28 February 1976, said:

> "In the cemetery there were two open graves and two bodies lying beside them. I went to see if I could recognize them. One was dead, but the other, a curly-haired, fair complexioned 18-year-old youth, was moving. Startled, I turned back and shouted, 'But officer, this man is alive.' 'Shut up, you dirty priest, or I will shut you up for good,' the officer retorted. Then the youth was pushed into the open grave, which was filled with earth. I swear to God that they buried this youth while he was still alive.
>
> "People were buried like dogs by the junta. There were also bodies which had been dumped outside the cemetery. They were not identified and not claimed. As a priest my conscience is troubled, but they were holding a pistol to my head at the time.
>
> "I remember the day they first came to me. They said: 'Father, we have some dead bodies which we want you to bury.' Of course, I replied, and asked how many bodies they had. 'Seventy-seven', they said. An hour later a lorry arrived and I heard someone say, 'Dump them outside.' They were dead bodies; they were all put into one common grave, without waiting for identification by their relatives. The junta man is commonly called 'Muskos' supporter and so on. When he was asked if there were Turks among the dead, he said 'Yes'."

73. What happened? The *coup* was for union of Cyprus. Today the Council was asked: "Why has Turkey come because of the *coup*? It had not harmed us." This is the approach, the mentality. Then he directed questions to all representatives: "Which country amongst us does not have a little trouble? Is that enough reason for Turkey to go and invade Cyprus?"

74. I repeat: Cyprus is not a proper State; it is a *sui generis* partnership State created by international agreements. And, because we did not trust the Greek Cypriots, we wanted guarantees. Only those guarantees have saved us from the ditches and saved the independent Republic of Cyprus. Had Makarios given us time for evolution, Cyprus would have grown up into nationhood—maybe. But revolution of this nature has destroyed it.

75. With regard to the complaints about Turkey's interfering and so on, I told the Council yesterday that during the past three or four months Mr. Kyprianou has been to Athens 14 times getting orders, instructions and aligning policy with Greece. And if the negotiations have come to a halt, it is because of the policy of Papandreou which he underlined on 24 November 1983 in Brussels to the Athens News Agency, in the following words: "We can hold negotiations only for a unitary Cyprus. For us, neither federation nor confederation is an acceptable solution." So why are we talking—intercommunal talks, good offices of the Secretary-General—if we are not talking about federation? And why are the talks not progressing? Because Greece is not allowing progress—that is why.

76. There have been complaints about our flag. When we had the Turkish flag and they had the Greek flag, they told the world that Turks had the Turkish flag. Now that we have our own flag they complain that we have our own flag. What is the implication? The implication is that we should have the Greek flag. We have refused it, we refuse it and we shall refuse it. The Greek flag is not our flag. We have our flag.

77. They have complained about a national anthem. Who are the complainants? Greek Cypriots who use the

Greek national anthem when they receive dignitaries —and they have received the Prime Minister of India— by playing the national anthem of Greece. They pass that off as the national anthem of Cyprus. They have complained that we have, or are going to have, a national anthem. Why? Because we must have the national anthem of Greece. We have refused it, we refuse it and we shall refuse it; we shall not have it; we shall have our own national anthem. And then they will bring us again to the Security Council for having done it.

78. Should we have brought them to the Security Council for adopting, under false pretences, the national anthem of Greece and presenting it to the world as the national anthem of Cyprus? And would India have agreed to three fourths of the nation securing a neighbouring country's flag and presenting it as India's flag without its consent?

79. Are we persons entitled to the same rights under the Charter as any other persons? Or, are we the slaves of the Greek era, denied everything? They are entitled to everything; we are denied everything in our own land, in our own partnership State. That is the picture of Cyprus. That is the trouble of Cyprus. That is the problem of Cyprus. And so long as the Council allows them to speak as the Government of Cyprus, as a 100 per cent racist régime, the problem of Cyprus will continue to bother the Council for ever.

80. We are accused of secessionist activities. I reject the accusation. One can secede from a legitimate existence. We were thrown out, kicked out, of our own State for 21 years. Then, when we put the "roof" of statehood over our heads, the Security Council, I am sorry to say, hurried to condemn us, without paying due consideration to the facts, because the leading countries hastened to condemn us for their own purposes. But I do not see that as a final position. I say: please take a look at your facts and please do so with compassion.

81. This is, again, what Makarios said on 2 March 1965:

> "Before Cyprus could unite with Greece, Greece had already united with Cyprus. How? Greece had sent her sons to struggle and die, if necessary, for their beloved brethren on the island."

Non-aligned peoples, countries and nations, that is the problem of Cyprus.

82. There have been complaints by one or two countries—which were informed only by the Greek Cypriots and the so-called representative of the Cyprus Government—that we are using Turkish lira. From 1963 we have been cut off from Cyprus pounds. We could not get Cyprus money unless we produced foreign exchange to the Central Bank of Cyprus, where all our reserves had been frozen—and are still frozen. We had to get help from Turkey in order to pay the Central Bank of Cyprus and get Cyprus money. Because all ports were in their hands we had to go to the Greek market to buy goods, and they were enriching themselves to the tune of 13 million pounds sterling a year—that was the aid we received from Turkey—in order to survive.

83. When Turkey liberated us—thank God—we asked Turkey not to send us hard currency, of which it was very short, and we started to use Turkish lira. They have been complaining that that indicates an invasion of Cyprus. This indicates the stealing of our rights in the Cyprus pound; it indicates nothing else. But again, like the flag, in order to avoid further misunderstanding we are working on a scheme for producing our money, if there is no solution very soon. We have to, because this accusation is being repeated. How can we reply to them? We cannot steal Cyprus money from them; it is all in the south. We cannot get it unless we give foreign exchange for it. What are we to do? Live without money, by exchanging beads? This is not the era for that. Therefore we must have our money, but when we have it we shall be brought here again.

84. The Greek Cypriots say: "They now defy the Security Council, and they are going to have their own currency." That is why I say: a body politic has to live and has to survive. This is not defiance; this is a necessity of life because of what they have done to us. I beg members to understand that and to appreciate it. We are too little a people to defy the Security Council or any country at all. We defy injustice; we defy wrong decisions; and we ask for correction while we try to give more information. If I have been speaking at great length—and I am sure members of the Council must be tired—it is because I do not get an opportunity like this all the time, whereas their ambassadors are going around, even today, purveying more misinformation to the world. We do not have that facility.

85. They say that we are using Turkish time. Well, our connections are with Turkey, thanks to you; you have cut us off from the world completely. All connections are with Turkey; so what is more natural than to use Turkish time? And, indicatively, Turkey uses European time. Sometimes it goes one hour ahead; that does not matter; we are one hour earlier; it is our misfortune; it does not matter; it does not harm them. What have they done to us that we should use their time? Are we together? We have been separate for 21 years. But it is a question of complaint here; it is very significant.

86. Then they say: "We give the Turkish Cypriots water and electricity free." At the talks there is still a paper on compensation for exchange of properties, for what they owe to us, for what we owe to them, which we have not yet touched upon. All this will be touched upon. But they never say that since 1963 they have been using the waterworks of Larnaca—our water for the whole of Larnaca—free of charge. This is what happened when separation came in 1963, not in 1974. We are taking account of all this, and we shall settle with them one way or the other. But these are matters of complaint against us.

87. I shall now take the liberty of reading out one sentence which I did not understand: "Even former non-believers admit that they are confronted with an unparalleled case of international deceit." [*See 2532nd meeting, para. 86.*] I really do not know what that means, and I do not know who among you are, in his view, "non-believers". We have placed our trust in all men and in all nations, whether they are believers or not, whether rightist or leftist, whether socialist or capitalist, because we know we are in the right. We are fighting for our existence in our own land, and we want the Council's help in order not to be dominated, not to become the servants of the Greek Cypriots. Their record is in the Secretary-General's reports.

88. The rule of law is what we want. Those who destroyed the 1960 set-up by force of arms and shed the blood of my community for 11 years in order to annex Cyprus to Greece are not entitled to preach anything to us about the rule of law. We do not rely on might; we rely on right. Turkey has come to Cyprus to save us in accordance with international treaties. Had there been no such treaties, I am sure Turkish public opinion would still have obliged the Turkish Government to come and stop the butchery of the twentieth century. We are grateful to Turkey for the sacrifices it has made in saving us from being destroyed.

89. In this statement—and again I apologize for its length—I have tried to draw a correct picture of the events. But I have been accused by the other side of picking out scattered events over the past 20 years. Therefore, let me show members again what are those facts. First, the planned onslaught for *enosis* and the destruction of independence still goes on. Secondly, the ejection of Turkish Cypriot personnel from all parts of the administration and all organs of the State still goes on. Thirdly, the ejection of members of Parliament still goes on. Fourthly, confiscation or freezing of all Turkish Cypriot assets at the Central Bank of Cyprus still goes on. Fifthly, the denial of all constitutional legal and fiscal rights still goes on. Sixthly, the ousting of Turkish Cypriots from the budget of Cyprus has been going on for 21 years. There is also the destruction of 103 villages and 107 mosques and forcing people to leave as refugees for 11 years; relief came only with Turkey's arrival. There are the dead and the missing. Those are the permanent edifices which continue to stand high, confirming my version of events, and no elocution can conceal the true facts if only one takes the trouble to consider them.

90. A State exists for the protection, happiness and prosperity of its people and is formed by the people. The non-aligned and all Members of the United Nations have taken it for granted that because they have retained the name of "Government of Cyprus" that is how they will look upon the State of Cyprus.

91. I shall read out from the official press release No. 4 of 1 April 1967 of the Greek Cypriot Public Information Office, which contains a statement by Mr. Kyprianou as to how he regards the State of Cyprus, which had become 100 per cent Greek because of the Greek armed onslaught, and as to why he is so much attached to it and thinks that by not recognizing him we are doing him a great deal of injustice. This is his statement:

> "Another essential prerequisite is the maintenance by the Greek Cypriots of their national issue as such" —there is no Cypriot national issue. "They should never think that the Cyprus question can be considered a political matter even for a moment. It is neither a political, nor a party nor a personal matter. It is a national issue, both for Cyprus and Greece."

I ask members: Where are we if it is a national issue for Cyprus and Greece? Where are the Turkish Cypriots? Where is Cypriotism? He continued, "And the solution cannot be anything else but *enosis*."

92. At this critical stage which the Cyprus struggle is passing through there is a great advantage which did not exist in 1955, and that is the fact that Cyprus now has a voice of its own in the international field. In spite of a large number of disadvantages, Cyprus is now an independent and sovereign State and, therefore, its struggle for union with Greece is easier and shorter than before. The non-aligned countries first, and the whole United Nations thereafter, have been and are being used to this end, because no one has raised the curtain to look beyond the name "the Government of Cyprus" and see what it is and why it is. For them it is the State of Cyprus. For us, it is the end. It is not a means to an end. For us it is homeland; it is our State, our independence, and we do not want it to be made Greek.

93. Finally, I will just cite a quotation from the Greek daily, *Eleftherotypia*, of 29 April 1984, in order to show the Council the Greek mentality:

> "The developments in Cyprus will follow the path wished by the Turks and Denktaş. The Cyprus problem can only be solved by the Greek army. This ignominy started in Izmir in 1920/1922"—when they tried to invade Turkey; they were thrown back—"The ignominy which started in Izmir, and ended with the establishment of a State by Denktaş, can only be washed away by bloodletting. The Greek army has responsibility and honour. It is high time to show up along the borders and hack the feet of the new Atilla."

That is the mentality of those who request Council resolutions giving them title to Cyprus and condemning us as enemies of Cyprus, as secessionists. They will then use those resolutions to attack us and clear Cyprus of the Turks.

94. I hope the Council will examine the facts of Cyprus anew and will give the Secretary-General the task of acting on the facts of Cyprus without having his hands tied by the imagined existence of a legitimate

Government of Cyprus, and I hope he will be able to bring Cyprus to the port of peace: that is, a bicommunal, bi-zonal, federal republic. We shall help him in that direction. We hope he succeeds. If he does not, allow us to exist in our State as free men, pending the realization by the Greek Cypriots that the United Nations, the Security Council, the Charter, have not been invented in order to make free people the servants of others and to penalize a binational island by force of arms.

95. I thank you, Mr. President, and I apologize for the length of my statement.

96. Mr. CHAMORRO MORA (Nicaragua) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: As this is my first statement in the Council this month, Sir, may I express my personal satisfaction at seeing you acting as President of the Council. We are familiar with your diplomatic and political experience and your skill in confronting and resolving difficult situations. Our two peoples and Governments enjoy fraternal relations of friendship based on full respect for the principle of the sovereign equality of States, regardless of their size, population or military or economic might, and we share respect for recognition of the fact that inter-State relations must be based on respect for the principle of self-determination. All this guarantees the success of our work and ensures that we will find solutions to the difficult problems confronting mankind. One such problem is the important one before us which, in our opinion, is the result of foreign military intervention in Cyprus.

97. Also, Mr. President, through you, I would like to congratulate the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for the splendid manner in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council last month. We personally witnessed, because of the complaint we brought, the skill he demonstrated in conducting the work of the Council.

98. My delegation listened yesterday [*2431st meeting*] with great interest to the brilliant presentation by Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus. We were much impressed with his faith in the international community and, furthermore, with his hope that this body would assume its rightful responsibility in maintaining peace and international security and consequently take appropriate action to ensure compliance with its resolutions on the subject. We were also impressed with his people's clamouring for justice. His is a small but proud country, a non-aligned country which, against its will, has seen 40 per cent of its territory militarily occupied. He has demanded a just and peaceful solution to the problem and to the military intervention which has existed since 1974.

99. The problem at present before us is of great concern to my Government, not only because of the important universal principles that are being violated, respect for which is of fundamental importance to the international community, but also because Cyprus' lawful and peaceful struggle for the recovery and full exercise of its inalienable rights in the territory occupied today is an historic struggle that many non-aligned countries have had to wage against powerful countries.

100. Furthermore, Cyprus is a founding member of, and enjoys great prestige and respect in, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which has constantly tried to find a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus, not only through the communiqués issued after its various summit or ministerial meetings, but also by setting up a contact group made up of members of the Movement which have made many efforts along these lines.

101. For these reasons, and because of the importance of the subject, we would like to begin our statement with a reference to the message sent by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and Chairperson of the Non-Aligned Movement, to our heads of State, following the unilateral declaration of independence which is the precise reason for this meeting. In that message, which reflects the feelings of the great majority of the international community, our Chairperson said that the Movement as a whole could only express its surprise and concern over that declaration, which not only undermined the unity of Cyprus but also violated its territorial integrity and sovereignty and jeopardized the non-aligned status of the island as a whole.

102. The members of the Movement, whose membership should be based on faithful compliance with its principles, have an unshakeable commitment to the sister non-aligned Republic of Cyprus to work to revoke the unilateral declaration and to support the Secretary-General's efforts to ensure full respect for the unified status of Cyprus and to curb all activities aimed at recognizing or supporting the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is nothing but a new term for foreign occupation, intervention and interference.

103. Nicaragua, as a non-aligned country, expresses its full support for the sister Republic of Cyprus, its people and Government, and reiterates its commitment to continue to give all the solidarity and support necessary to bring about the complete revocation of the unilateral declaration of independence, the immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces, the complete demilitarization of Cyprus as proposed by its President, and the realization of its legitimate right to independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment.

104. Since the invasion and occupation of part of Cyprus by foreign forces in 1974, both the Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted numerous resolutions aimed at bringing about a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus. Security Council resolution 365 (1974)—which urged the immediate implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assem-

bly on 1 November 1974—is particularly relevant at the present time, when the situation in that country has worsened. Those resolutions, as well as those adopted subsequently, contain the necessary elements for a just and lasting settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

105. In those resolutions the international community has reflected its full support for the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Cyprus and its repudiation of the occupation of part of its territory by foreign forces, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all the occupation forces. At the same time, those resolutions consider that the *de facto* situation created by the invading forces cannot form part of a solution to the problem and urge the parties to refrain from any unilateral acts which could have a negative impact on the prospects for a just and lasting solution to the problems of Cyprus.

106. As long ago as 1975 the Security Council had to consider the decision taken at that time to turn the part of Cyprus occupied by foreign forces into a "Federated Turkish State", and it adopted resolution 367 (1975), which, *inter alia*, regretted that unilateral decision and reiterated the principles contained in previous resolutions, requesting the Secretary-General to undertake a mission of good offices and calling upon the two communities to co-operate.

107. Furthermore, Security Council resolution 541 (1983), adopted last November, was produced when, to the perplexity of the whole world, new attempts were being made to divide the Republic of Cyprus, in flagrant violation of previous resolutions which called on all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus and not to take any action which would violate those rights. That resolution, for which our delegation voted, deplored the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, and, in paragraph 2, considered the declaration legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. It also called upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus, renewed the Secretary-General's mandate to pursue his mission of good offices and called upon the parties to co-operate with him.

108. In this respect, it is important to recall here that after the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot community purporting to establish an independent State called the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", the Secretary-General made a statement [*see 2497th meeting, para. 9*] in which, in addition to expressing his opinion that the step was contrary to the Security Council resolutions and the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, he said that the declaration impeded the efforts of his Special Representative, who had arrived in Cyprus only a few days earlier.

109. In recent weeks we have seen how the Secretary-General's Special Representative has again been exposed to a similar situation, when while he was in Cyprus there occurred an exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the new, so-called Turkish Cypriot State. These new actions not only ignore the efforts of the Secretary-General and the authority of the Security Council, which had given him his mandate, but also, *inter alia*, violated Council resolution 541 (1983), in paragraph 7 of which it "Calls upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus".

110. It is my delegation's opinion that the Security Council must not allow its resolutions and its authority to continue to be undermined, for ultimately what is at stake is our ability to prevent the use of force, military adventurism and foreign intervention and occupation —direct or indirect, overt or covert—from prevailing in international relations, contrary to the norms of international law, which every day is violated more frequently by some Members of our Organization.

111. Ever since 1975, when we gave him his present mandate, the Secretary-General has acted with great prudence and skill and has tried to bring about a just and lasting political solution to the problem of Cyprus. In his report of 1 May 1984 [*S/16519*] he has told us of his most recent actions. His proposals to the parties have been marked by great moderation, as we could see in the plan submitted to the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community on 16 March this year [*ibid., para. 14*]. This plan, consisting of five points, has not met with the necessary receptiveness which would allow further progress in his actions.

112. We see that while the Secretary-General appealed to the parties not to take any actions complementary to the declaration of 15 November 1983, or to continue carrying out the initiatives which were under way, a few days earlier—on 6 March 1984—the Turkish Cypriot leaders had announced their intention to adopt their own flag. After the Secretary-General submitted his plan on 10 April, Mr. Denktaş announced that he would carry out a constitutional referendum and an election in August and November this year. All this shows that the intent to consolidate the so-called Turkish Cypriot State continues to exist, and that for one of the parties Security Council resolution 541 (1983) is a dead letter.

113. This Council and, through it, the international community have heard the appeal of the President of Cyprus for an end to a situation which in fact represents the partition of Cyprus and which constitutes an attack on the very existence of that small State. We have heard what we already knew about the great flexibility shown by the legitimate Government of the country in the negotiations with the communities, despite occupation by a foreign military force.

114. We think it is very important that the Council assume its proper role in the settlement of the problem before it. The words of President Kyprianou should give us pause, especially in view of the disappointing

results of the efforts made by Cyprus itself, by the non-aligned, and by the United Nations to find a solution to the problem of Cyprus within the framework of international law. Therefore, we must see to it that the Council's resolutions do not continue to be ignored. That is the challenge before us; we must meet it without hesitation.

115. Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): May I take this opportunity, Mr. President, of associating myself fully with the tributes paid to you by my colleagues who spoke before me. Since this is the second time my delegation has participated in the deliberations of the Security Council under your presidency, we are keenly aware of your exceptional personal qualities and your wealth of diplomatic skill, experience and statesmanship. We are confident that your tested leadership will enable the Council to conduct its business successfully and effectively during your presidency. I avail myself of this opportunity also to express our deep appreciation of the excellent manner in which your predecessor, Mr. Vladimir Alekseyevich Kravets, guided the work of the Council during the month of April.

116. On this occasion the Security Council has been convened to consider the exchange of envoys which took place last month between Turkey and Northern Cyprus, and the intention of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to conduct a constitutional referendum and elections later this year. We have listened with great attention and due care to the statements by President Kyprianou and by those who have spoken in support of the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, which, indeed, is a common concern of both sides to the dispute. We have also paid equal attention to the eloquent presentations made by Mr. Denktaş and by the representative of Turkey concerning the genesis of the Cyprus problem and the circumstances which made the latest developments inevitable.

117. It is easy to work oneself into a rage on the basis of one set of assumptions, or into despair and condemnation on the basis of another. It would not be at all helpful in the present circumstances, however, to take a one-sided view, when a genuine attempt has to be made to bring about a negotiated and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question, the origins of which lie in the developments which immediately followed the independence of Cyprus, in particular the breakdown of its constitutional setup in 1963.

118. The Security Council has been seized of the Cyprus question for the past 20 years, during which events have marched inexorably towards the present state of affairs, when Cyprus is virtually divided into two separate entities. Those who allowed the distortion of the political processes in Cyprus 20 years ago by neglecting the historical and cultural realities of the situation did not appear to have comprehended its implications or to have foreseen its culmination in the present impasse. Today, all of us are called upon to take an impartial, farsighted and statesmanlike view of the current developments and to take decisions which we may not rue in the future.

119. The last occasion on which the situation in Cyprus was the subject of a full debate in the Security Council was in November 1983, when the Turkish Cypriot community and its leadership made a proclamation of independence. That debate culminated in the adoption of resolution 541 (1983). We opposed that resolution on the ground that it failed to take into account the historical and cultural aspects of the process of political evolution in Cyprus and the profound sense of disappointment and outrage of the Turkish Cypriot community, engendered by the frustration of the political process envisaged at the birth of the island's independence.

120. The defiant course to which the Turkish Cypriot community has been obliged to resort is a product of its despair at the bleakness of efforts made over the past 20 years to ensure the fulfilment of its historical, cultural, political and humanitarian aspirations as guaranteed to a co-founder of the State of Cyprus under the 1960 Constitution. Viewed in its proper historical perspective, the Turkish Cypriots' decision to proclaim independence last November was no more a violation of international law than the numerous grave violations which had preceded it. That is why we regarded the adoption of resolution 541 (1983) as compounding rather than mitigating the circumstances which threatened to shake the very foundations of the State.

121. In disassociating itself from resolution 541 (1983), Pakistan cautioned the members of the Council that such a resolution would neither serve the cause of conciliation in Cyprus nor help the Secretary-General's mission of good offices, which it was intended to promote. We were not, therefore, surprised when, following the adoption of the resolution, it was categorically rejected by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

122. The one-sided nature of resolution 541 (1983) could not have been expected to facilitate the task of the Secretary-General while renewing his mandate to use his good offices. In view of the inherent flaw in the resolution as a basis for initiating conciliation efforts, it redounds to the Secretary-General's prestige and statesmanship that he succeeded nevertheless to reactivate contacts with the two Cypriot communities and offer them a five-point scenario which yet holds the promise of developing into a framework for the resumption of high-level intercommunal talks. Here, I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the compatibility of the five-point scenario with the four-point proposal made by Mr. Denktaş in his letter of 18 April to the Secretary-General [*ibid., annex IV*].

123. Like the proclamation of independence by the Turkish Cypriot community last November, the recent developments in the field of diplomatic exchanges between the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey must not be seen in isolation from the unresolved con-

flict and unredeemed hostility which have embittered relations between the two Cypriot communities over the past decades, and in particular following the disruption of the delicate balance of an independent, bicommunal, bi-zonal federation. The feelings of despair and hopelessness felt by the Turkish Cypriot community have been further exacerbated by the protracted deadlock in the intercommunal negotiations, which, in their perception, prolonged and could perpetuate the denial of their status of equality and their legitimate national rights.

124. In the statements made before the Council by Mr. Denktaş there are important elements which strengthen our belief that it is not too late to retrieve the situation in Cyprus and to nourish the roots of conciliation and coexistence in a federal State, which lie in that situation. His statements made it quite clear that the Turkish Cypriot community continues to adhere to the concept of a united Cyprus within a bicommunal, bizonal and federal framework, as provided for by the high-level agreements between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities in 1977 [*see S/12323, para. 5*] and 1979 [*see S/13369, para. 51*] and by the 1980 opening statement of the Secretary-General [*S/14100, annex*]. The continued loyalty of the Turkish community to the federal concept is predicated on its expectation that such a framework would ensure the fulfilment of its legitimate aspirations to equal partnership in the conduct of the affairs of the State. The right of the Turkish community to equal status and partnership is *sui generis*, being inherent in the 1960 Constitution, and cannot be qualified or diminished by the stipulation of customary distinctions between a majority and a minority community within a State.

125. In these circumstances we may ask how the Council should respond to the developments in Cyprus and how it should pronounce itself on the matter that has been brought before it? In our view the Council would be shirking a major responsibility if it were to limit itself to announcing a verdict on the immediate developments, which are but a symptom of a deep and recurring malaise. The lesson of the tragic happenings of the past 20 years is that the panacea for this malaise lies in the establishment of a bicommunal, bi-zonal federal structure for the State of Cyprus. While this option is still available and the unity of the State of Cyprus within a federal framework is still a viable proposition, a beginning has to be made towards that end with the resumption of the intercommunal dialogue. Any preconditions which are unacceptable to one or the other community would only serve to freeze the negotiating process and lead inevitably to the consolidation of the *de facto* partition of the island.

126. The Turkish Cypriot community's readiness for a dialogue and the resumption of intercommunal talks through the good offices of the Secretary-General is vouched for in the statement made before the Council by Mr. Denktaş, who also speaks of the Turkish Cypriot community's desire to engage in serious negotiations for a comprehensive settlement in his letter of 18 April addressed to the Secretary-General.

127. It is quite clear that a basis does exist for a fruitful continuation of the Secretary-General's good offices. It is imperative that this basis not be impaired by the adoption of another one-sided resolution which could result in the irretrievable loss of co-operation by one of the communities so vital to the success of the Secretary-General's efforts. Despite his disappointments, which are inherent in the evolving situation in Cyprus, the Secretary-General has not given in to despair, and in his report in document S/16519 of 1 May 1984 he has once again assured the Security Council that he is prepared to carry on his mission of good offices as long as there is unambiguous support for it. He also mentions the continued deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force as another essential requirement for the success of his efforts.

128. In order to revitalize the search for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question the Council is now called upon to adopt a resolution which would provide the necessary political support to the good offices of the Secretary-General and facilitate his task by encouraging dialogue and the negotiating process. This purpose can be served only by the adoption of a resolution which is not rejected by either side. It goes without saying that a mandate based on a resolution unacceptable to one of the communities would hardly generate the kind of political support which the Secretary-General regards as essential for the renewal and success of his mission of good offices.

129. Here is another opportunity for the Security Council to turn the course of events in Cyprus in the right direction. Pakistan will extend its full co-operation to any effort to promote conciliation, understanding, confidence and trust between the two Cypriot communities and will support any step which would put the Secretary-General's mission of good offices back on the tracks, reviving the hope for a peaceful and just solution of the Cyprus question. By the same token Pakistan may not be expected to associate itself with any step which would further embitter the relations between the two communities, complicate the task entrusted to the Secretary-General and perhaps extinguish forever the hope for a united Cyprus built on the consensus of the communities that constitute it.

130. Mr. ARIAS STELLA (Peru) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: It is a particular pleasure for the delegation of Peru to see you, Sir, presiding over this meeting. Your diplomatic abilities and poise, your calm and amiable manner, as well as your warm personality, guarantee success in the discharge of your responsibilities as President of the Security Council for this month. I should also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to Mr. Kravets of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for the skill and brilliance with which he conducted the proceedings of this body last month. We extend to him our most sincere congratulations.

131. In this debate the parties involved in the question of Cyprus have made a point of reminding us that the hostilities, the vicious circle of slow advances and retreats and the recent deterioration of the situation have been occurring over a period that has now lasted more than 20 years. We wish to stress that over that long stretch of time the United Nations has striven intensely to attain the goals for which the Organization was created. It has maintained and continues to maintain in Cyprus a juridical, political and humanitarian presence in accordance with the decisions of its competent organs and through the useful and timely deployment of its peace-keeping force.

132. Almost half this time has been spent in pursuing what, in our judgement, constitutes the keystone of this ongoing conciliation effort—namely, the discharge of the mission of good offices the international community has entrusted to the Secretary-General and which it has renewed on successive occasions.

133. The Security Council and the General Assembly have from the very beginning, and on repeated occasions since, right up to December of last year, taken a position on the facts which have kept the question of Cyprus on the list of the most burning international conflicts. The resolutions that have been adopted also contain the guidelines for the negotiation of a broad, just and definitive political settlement.

134. It is well known that the Peruvian Government has given its wholehearted support to the framework laid down by the United Nations and the consistent positions adopted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries which have been reaffirmed at so many of its meetings, because we believe that those positions are based on the common objective of ensuring strict respect for the norms of international law set forth in the Charter and other international instruments, norms that have largely been violated in the case of the Cypriot people. We believe it to be our duty to stress now that those positions retain their validity and their force.

135. For these reasons, and bearing in mind the report of the Secretary-General in document S/16519, Peru shares the legitimate concern of the international community in noting that in spite of the process promoted by the United Nations, results have not so far been forthcoming that give grounds for hoping for any early understanding between the parties to the dispute.

136. It is our understanding that at the present stage of this conflict there are three substantive aspects that must be given priority attention.

137. First, we must bear in mind the principle that the final understanding which is the ultimate objective of the ongoing attempts must ensure recognition of and respect for the federal nature, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, as well as its non-aligned status, with all the attributes necessary for it to exercise those rights effectively.

138. Secondly, to ensure a decisive step forward, there must be a compromise that will make possible the immediate resumption of communication between the parties. It is obvious that without intercommunal dialogue there can be no progress. The Secretary-General has been sufficiently clear on this score in his report. These conversations should be held in the same spirit of cordiality and calm that prevailed on previous occasions. Only that spirit will make it possible to adopt a constructive approach to the crucial elements of the controversy.

139. Thirdly, it is necessary to revitalize the good-offices mission of the Secretary-General with the most solid and unequivocal support, both of the parties directly concerned and of the international community.

140. If the Security Council has to take a further decision on the question of Cyprus, we believe it should do so in the light of the elements I have just mentioned.

141. My delegation is aware that the question of Cyprus is extremely complex and delicate. In this case, and in the positions taken by the countries concerned, we have seen the introduction or frequent influence of elements alien to the essence of the problem and to the interests of the Cypriot people, the effect of which is undoubtedly disruptive and distorting. It cannot be denied that these factors, whatever the explanation for them may be from the various national standpoints, underlie the procrastination and the danger of paralysis that are affecting this process.

142. My delegation cannot refrain from expressing its appreciation for the work being done by UNFICYP, which, apart from discharging its lofty mission so efficiently, has, as Secretary-General does well to point out in his report, been lending its co-operation in the solution of immediate humanitarian problems, and in this regard it is important for us to recall that the situation in Cyprus is also a basically human problem, with its tragic toll of lives, disappearances and the mass displacement of people from their homes.

143. With a view to reinitiating the common quest for formulas that will clear the way to a negotiated agreement that would take into account the interests of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, that is to say the Cypriot people, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, we urgently appeal to the responsible Governments and leaders to adopt realistic and constructive positions. We appeal to them to demonstrate unequivocally their dedication to peace and a genuine political will. Neither isolated or unrecognized unilateral acts, no matter how numerous they may be, nor intransigent or extreme positions, no matter how comprehensible they may be, will contribute to the common goal of restoring harmony in the island.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.